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NO-FAULT DIGITAL PLATFORM MONOPOLIZATION
MARINA LAO*
ABSTRACT
The power of today’s tech giants has prompted calls for changes in
antitrust law and policy which, for decades, has been exceedingly
permissive in merger enforcement and in constraining dominant firm
conduct. Economically, the fear is that the largest digital platforms
are so dominant and its data advantage so substantial that competi-
tion is foreclosed, resulting in long-term harm to consumers and to
the economy. But the concerns extend beyond economics. Critics
worry, too, that the large platforms’ tremendous economic power
poses risks of social and political harm and threatens our democracy.
These concerns have prompted discussions of ways to reinvigorate
section 2 of the Sherman Act.
One of those suggestions is no-fault monopolization, a theory that
dispenses with the conduct requirement of monopolization. Much of
the appeal of no-fault monopolization, first considered in the late
1960s through the 1970s, is that it would sidestep the difficult “bad
act” and “anticompetitive effects” requirements of section 2, which are
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particularly difficult to prove in digital platform markets, for reasons
that the Article addresses.
This Article discusses why no-fault monopolization would be
inadvisable, though stronger section 2 enforcement is long overdue.
Rather than adopt an approach with uncertain results that might do
more harm than good, I suggest more modest changes tailored to
specific problems that could nevertheless reinvigorate section 2. They
include greater vigilance in identifying improper conduct, and
seeking a steady widening of the scope of exclusionary conduct
through bolder choice of cases, moving toward greater flexibility in
the analysis of anticompetitive effects, and overcoming some of the
skepticism surrounding the legitimacy and value of qualitative
evidence, including intent evidence.
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INTRODUCTION
After decades of judicial and agency permissiveness in merger
enforcement and in the application of section 2 of the Sherman Act,1
the law that prohibits monopolization, many are calling for a new
antitrust equilibrium.2 Industrial concentration has risen steadily
in many business sectors in the United States,3 as have firm prof-
its.4 The evidence also suggests a weakening of competition5 and at
least a link between increased market power and widening economic
inequality in this country.6 Emergent economic literature, moreover,
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize
... shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”).
2. See TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 16-19 (2018);
Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 529-30
(2013); see also AM. ANTITRUST INST. MONOPOLIZATION CHAPTER, RESTORING MONOPOLY AND
EXCLUSION AS CORE COMPETITION CONCERNS: AAI 2016 PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION REPORT,
(Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Monopoliza
tionfinal_0-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YKK6-UPTL] (criticizing, among other things, the current
lax approach toward section 2 enforcement and urging that agencies take a more aggressive
stance toward dominant firm exclusionary conduct).
3. See COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: BENEFITS OF COMPETITION AND
INDICATORS OF MARKET POWER 4 (2016) [hereinafter CEA Issue Brief on Competition], https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/page/files/ 20160414_cea_competition_issue_
brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM57-43BQ] (citing empirical research and statistical data); Carl
Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 721-29, https://faculty.
haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/antitrustpopulism.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDH2-FGEF].
4. See Shapiro, supra note 3, at 731-34 (presenting data that shows corporate profits had
increased substantially as a percentage of GDP over the past few decades). An increase of
profits as a percentage of GDP could suggest the absence of robust competition since
competitive forces tend to erode above-normal profits over time. See CEA Issue Brief on
Competition, supra note 3, at 1.
5. See, e.g., CEA Issue Brief on Competition, supra note 3, at 1. However, economists
have pointed out that increased concentration may have innocent explanations and does not
necessarily reflect declining competition. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 3, at 731-32 (citing
several empirical studies that suggest increases in industry concentration and corporate
profits were likely explained by higher productivity on the part of “super-star” firms, which
then manage to “capture a larger slice of the market,” or by more use of information tech-
nology systems—both of which would be positive explanations of concentration and would not
reflect reduced competition).
6. See Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and
Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11 (2015) (arguing that “returns from market power go
disproportionately to the wealthy,” that is, to shareholders and senior executives); Lina Khan
& Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust Counterrevolution and Its
Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 235-36 (2017). But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust
and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1173-75 (2016) (refuting the assertion that
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reveals that large firms can wield monopsony power in the purchase
of labor in local markets,7 which could partially explain the stubborn
stagnation of wages in the past few decades even when, as now,
unemployment is low.8
Much of the widespread anxiety over excessive private power is
focused on the largest digital platforms—primarily Facebook,
Google, Amazon, and Apple.9 Economically, critics fear that these
dominant platforms could foreclose competition by quashing inno-
vation through various strategies such as application cloning10 or
monopoly power contributes to wealth inequality by arguing, in part, that monopoly rents are
broadly shared).
7. See generally COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, ISSUE BRIEF: LABOR MARKET MONOPSONY:
TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND POLICY RESPONSES (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/sites/default/files/page/files/20161025_monopsony_labor_mrkt_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NAA9-PB4T]; Ioana Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor
Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1038 (2019) (making the case that large firms exercise monopsony
power in the purchase of labor in local markets, which has the effect of suppressing wages);
Orley C. Ashenfelter et al., Modern Models of Monopsony in Labor Markets: A Brief Survey
(Inst. for the Study of Labor, Working Paper No. 4915, 2010), http://www.econstor.eu/
bitstream/10419/36902/1/625315251.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8VM-XJV4]; José Azar et al.,
Labor Market Concentration (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147,
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24147 [https://perma.cc/85B8-2AF5].
8. See ALAN B. KRUEGER & ERIC A. POSNER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR
PROTECTING LOW-INCOME WORKERS FROM MONOPSONY AND COLLUSION 4, 6 (2018), http://
www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/files/protecting_low_income_workers_from_monopsony_col
lusion_krueger_posner_pp.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9UA-F6NE]; Marinescu & Hovenkamp,
supra note 7, at 1033-34, 1037-38, 1041; see also RANDY M. STUTZ, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE
EVOLVING ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF LABOR-MARKET RESTRAINTS: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE,
2, 9 (2018), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/AAI-Labor-Anti
trust-White-Paper_0-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P9U-E83N].
9. See, e.g., John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1503-
04, 1509-10 (2019); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 802-
03 (2017); Greg Ip, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook, Google and Amazon, WALL ST. J.
(Jan. 16, 2018, 11:52 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-antitrust-case-against-facebook-
google-amazon-and-apple-1516121561 [https://perma.cc/6Q9K-LZLA]; Jonathan Taplin, Can
the Tech Giants Be Stopped?, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2017, 2:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/can-the-tech-giants-be-stopped-1500057243 [https://perma.cc/U6PG-H77Y].
10. See Elizabeth Dwoskin, Facebook’s Willingness to Copy Rivals’ Apps Seen as Hurting
Innovation, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/
facebooks-willingness-to-copy-rivals-apps-seen-as-hurting-innovation/2017/08/10/ea7188ea-
7df6-11e7-a669-b400c5c7e1cc_story.html [https://perma.cc/38YY-JA25]; Betsy Morris & Deepa
Seetharaman, The New Copycats: How Facebook Squashes Competition from Startups, WALL
ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2017, 1:47 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-copycats-how-facebook-
squashes-competition-from-startups-1502293444 [https://perma.cc/9K8E-T96E] (reporting on
Facebook’s copying features of a start-up group video chat app).
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acquisitions of nascent start-ups.11 A related fear is that the large
platform companies could use their troves of user data to gain early
insights into consumer trends, which would allow them to identify
and forestall nascent competitive threats.12 Or, their data advantage
could simply be so substantial that it forecloses entry.13 But the
concerns extend beyond economics. Critics worry, too, that the large
platforms’ persistent dominance poses risks of social and political
harm and threatens our democracy.14
Unsurprisingly, this angst over the power of the largest tech firms
and its potential economic and political implications has prompted
discussions of ways to strengthen merger control15 and to revive
11. A Lapse in Concentration, ECONOMIST (Sept. 29, 2016), https://www.economist.com/
special-report/2016/09/29/a-lapse-in-concentration [https://perma.cc/LE75-FQX8] (“Big tech
firms also have a penchant for so-called ‘shoot-out’ acquisitions, whereby a startup is bought
to eliminate a budding rival.... [I]f small firms cannot become independently big, the market
power of incumbents is not sufficiently challenged.”).
12. MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION POLICY 286-87
(2016).
13. See Marina Lao, Erring on the Side of Antitrust Enforcement When in Doubt in Data-
Driven Mergers, in 1 DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, LIBER AMICORUM: AN ANTITRUST PROFESSOR ON
THE BENCH 502-06 (Nicolas Charbit et al. eds., 2018) (discussing the broad competitive issues
animating the big data debate, including whether big data presents an entry barrier for online
services, whether and how the large digital platforms’ collection and use of big data implicates
competition and affects consumer welfare, and whether and how antitrust law might address
these issues); Damien Geradin & Monika Kuschewsky, Competition Law and Personal Data:
Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue 2 (Feb. 13, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216088 [https://perma.cc/F38N-LXUY] (“The acquisition of large
volumes of data by ‘first mover’ providers may, however, raise barriers to entry and thus
deprive users from the benefits of competition.”); see also EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR,
PRIVACY AND COMPETITIVENESS IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN DATA
PROTECTION, COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY ¶¶ 66-
68 (Preliminary Opinion) (2014), https://edps.europa.eu/ sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_
competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BP3L-LP4F] (“Powerful or dominant
undertakings are able to ... create barriers to entry through their control of huge personal
datasets ... [which] could prevent the development of competing products from competitors.”).
14. See WU, supra note 2, at 21 (“The power that [Facebook, Amazon, Google, and Apple]
wield seems to capture the sense of concern we have that the problems we face transcend the
narrowly economic. Big tech is ubiquitous, seems to know too much about us, and seems to
have too much power over what we see, hear, do, and even feel.”); Khan & Vaheesan, supra
note 6, at 235-36 (arguing generally that market power contributes to economic inequality,
gives firms political clout, and threatens American democracy).
15. Besides strengthening section 2 enforcement, another obvious way to tackle increasing
concentration is to engage in a campaign of stronger merger enforcement. For commentaries
supporting a stronger merger policy, see, for example, JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER
CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 71 (2015) (using
retrospective studies to suggest current underenforcement of merger control); Herbert
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section 2, a law that has lost much of its potency since the early
1980s.16 One of the ideas mentioned in connection with section 2
approximates “no-fault” monopolization—that is, dispensing with
the conduct requirement of a monopolization cause of action.17 The
no-fault theory, which appears to underlie Senator (and presidential
candidate) Elizabeth Warren’s recent policy proposal to break up
Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Apple,18 was first considered in the
late 1960s through the 1970s.19 Initially endorsed by many antitrust
intellectuals of the day, including Donald Turner, Philip Areeda,
Oliver Williamson and others, a number of ambitious no-fault ini-
tiatives introduced during this period ultimately failed.20
The end of the 1970s ushered in the current modern (or conserva-
tive) era of antitrust, which favors a limited role for antitrust
especially in the context of section 2, effectively ending the no-fault
conversation. Courts adopted demanding standards and burdens of
proof that made section 2 liability very difficult to establish.21 And
Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127
YALE L.J. 1996, 1996 (2018) (proposing to increase reliance on the structural presumption in
order to strengthen merger enforcement); and Lao, supra note 13, at 497, 529-30 (arguing that
stronger merger enforcement would be a better solution than section 2 in dealing with
competition issues involving big-data companies).
16. See William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future
of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1140-42 (describing
the period after 1980 as one of permissiveness toward single-firm conduct and horizontal
mergers).
17. Under long-established doctrine, section 2 requires proof of the defendant’s monopoly
power in a defined market and the use of improper, or “exclusionary,” conduct, in attaining,
maintaining, or enhancing that power. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570
(1966); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
18. Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c [https://
perma.cc/FHK5-EKXE].
19. For thorough and insightful discussions of the no-fault movement and other
deconcentration efforts in the late 1960s through 1980, see Harry First, Woodstock Antitrust,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018, at 59, 62; and Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1137-39.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (speaking of the costs of antitrust intervention compared to the “slight benefits,”
warning against the harms of false positives, and generally imposing a high bar for
establishing section 2 liability); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 2-4, 10-11, 15-16 (1984) (setting forth the Chicago School theory that the risks and
costs of false positives are higher than that of false negatives because it is easy to confuse
procompetitive conduct with anticompetitive conduct, and the adverse effects of false positives
tend to be substantial while that of false negatives minimal).
2020] NO-FAULT DIGITAL PLATFORM MONOPOLIZATION 763
the government rarely brought monopolization cases after the
1970s, United States v. Microsoft Corp. being a notable exception.22
This relative inactivity on the section 2 front,23 coupled with a
permissive merger policy, contributed to a perception that antitrust
law is not up to the task of tackling dominance issues today,
particularly those involving the largest technology platforms.
Frustrations with the limits of antitrust in this regard on the part
of some critics brought forth a new movement, sometimes called
New Brandeis antitrust (or sometimes, pejoratively, “Hipster”
antitrust).24 Although loosely unified by a strong distrust of the
largest technology companies and a shared belief that modern
antitrust law has abandoned its populist roots, New Brandeis
proponents are a varied group who hold different views on how
antitrust should be reformed.25 One suggested framework carries
echoes of earlier no-fault proposals, by eliminating the exclusionary
conduct requirement of section 2 when excess market power is
shown.26
22. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Other section 2 cases that have been brought include:
McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 F.3d 814, 827 & n.10 (11th Cir. 2015); FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., 107 F.
Supp. 3d 428, 437 (E.D. Pa. 2015); In re IDEXX Labs., Inc., No. 101-0023, 2013 WL 632874,
at *3-5 (F.T.C. Feb. 11, 2013); In re Pool Corp., No. 101-0115, 2012 WL 259752, at *3-6 (F.T.C.
Jan. 10, 2012); In re Transitions Optical, Inc., No. C-4289, 2010 WL 1804580, at *2 (F.T.C.
Apr. 22, 2010); Statement of the Federal Trade Commission in the Matter of Cardinal Health,
Inc., FTC File No. 101-0006 (Apr. 17, 2015), https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/663778Y150420cardinalhealthcommstmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/S97K-45RY].
23. It should be noted that the Federal Trade Commission currently has two pending
dominant firm conduct cases in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries: FTC v.
Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (alleging that the branded drug
manufacturer was delaying generic competition by constantly making objectively baseless
filings to the Food & Drug Administration); and FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-
LHK, 2019 WL 2206013, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2019) (charging Qualcomm with refusing
to license its standard-essential patents to rival chipmakers in order to protect its monopoly
over processors used in cell phones).
24. See generally Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust—A Brief Fling or Something
More?, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Apr. 2018 (providing a brief account of “hipster antitrust,” a
term he coined, also referred to as New Brandeis antitrust).
25. For commentaries generally considered to be New Brandeisian, see Khan, supra note
9, at 710, 762-63; Lina M. Khan, The Ideological Roots of America’s Market Power Problem,
127 YALE L.J. F. 960, 960-61 (2018) [hereinafter Khan, Ideological Roots]; Khan & Vaheesan,
supra note 6, at 235-36; Newman, supra note 9, at 1501-02; Sandeep Vaheesan, The Twilight
of the Technocrats’ Monopoly on Antitrust?, 127 YALE L.J. F. 980, 981-82, 993-94 (2018); and
Ramsi A. Woodcock, Inconsistency in Antitrust, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 105, 106, 108 (2013).
26. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 285 (proposing a no-fault monopoly and
oligopoly law that would not require bad acts to find liability against firms that possess
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Current monopolization doctrine in the United States requires
proof of a firm’s monopoly power in a relevant market, and its use
of improper (“exclusionary”) conduct to create, protect, or enhance
its monopoly.27 The conduct must also have an “anticompetitive
effect.”28 A no-fault monopolization theory as a deconcentration tool
for the technology platform markets would be a radical, paradigm-
shifting move that would require legislative action. I argue that
reform efforts in this direction would be misplaced for various
reasons, at least at this time. If the suggestion is economically
motivated, then it would be prudent to have some reliable evidence,
not just a rough judgment, that the economic benefits of dispersing
the platforms’ power outweigh the losses, before any attempt is
made to restructure some of the country’s most creative and success-
ful companies.29 If the motivation is to address a variety of non-
economic harms, such as threats to our democracy, including the
problems of “fake news,” privacy intrusions, and rising economic
inequality, then it is doubtful that no-fault, or antitrust generally,
is a particularly good tool to address these serious, but non-
competition-related, problems.30 Tax, labor, privacy, and consumer
protection laws; and education, job training, social insurance, and
other governmental programs directly tailored to the problems at
monopoly power); Woodcock, supra note 25, at 116 (implicitly endorsing a no-fault approach
by arguing that the conduct requirement of section 2 is a “bias in favor of monopolies” and
amounts to a “per se rule in favor of monopolization”).
27. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (articulating the two
elements of the monopolization offense as: “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or
historic accident”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“A firm
violates § 2 only when it acquires or maintains, or attempts to acquire or maintain, a
monopoly by engaging in exclusionary conduct ‘as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.’” (quoting
Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571)).
28. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59 (“From a century of case law on monopolization under
§ 2, however, several principles do emerge. First, to be condemned as exclusionary, a
monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive
process and thereby harm consumers.... Second, the plaintiff ... must demonstrate that the
monopolist’s conduct indeed has the requisite anticompetitive effect.”).
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.B.
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issue would likely be more effective while at the same time imposing
fewer collateral costs.31
Furthermore, to the extent that simplicity is the goal, a no-fault
approach may prove disappointing as it raises some troubling
questions for which there are no easy answers. For example,
important issues relating to when no-fault rules should be triggered,
what the appropriate measure of power should be, and whether
discretion in enforcement should be permissible are all difficult to
resolve, rendering the solution hardly as effortless as it might
seem.32
A better solution, in my view, would be to retain the conduct and
effects requirements, but work toward a more activist vision of
section 2 through an evolution of law and policy in a more pro-
plaintiff direction.33 This could mean greater vigilance in identifying
improper conduct and seeking a steady widening of the scope of
exclusionary conduct through bolder choice of cases.34 Moving
toward greater flexibility in the analysis of anticompetitive effects,
an approach that was implicitly endorsed in United States v.
Microsoft Corp.,35 would be helpful as well. Additionally, the current
ineffectualness of section 2 stems largely from the high burdens of
proof imposed on plaintiffs, combined with the inherent difficulty of
proving dynamic harms.36 In light of that, slightly lessening the
plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, such as through the adoption of
certain rebuttable presumptions and greater acceptance of qualita-
tive evidence, including intent evidence, would alleviate some of the
unusual difficulties of proof.37 While these “fixes” may appear
modest compared to no-fault and other somewhat vague New
Brandeis proposals, they can be more feasibly accomplished and
lead to meaningful changes, without the need for major legislative
action and without the complete disruption of an existing frame-
work that is conceptually sound.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. See infra Part III.C.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See infra Part IV.
35. 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
36. See infra Part II.C.1.
37. See infra Part IV.
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In this Article, I focus my discussion on no-fault monopolization,
including its drawbacks, and make some alternative suggestions for
edging toward stronger section 2 enforcement, but I shall leave the
discussion of various other New Brandeis suggestions to others. The
Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I discuss the original no-fault
movement, its economic underpinnings, the support it had from
intellectuals at the time, and its ultimate failure. In Part II, I
discuss the digital platform markets, the enduring dominance of the
largest platforms, and the New Brandeis frustration with section 2
law and policy, leading to renewed political interest in no-fault
monopolization. In Part III, I discuss why, in my view, reform
efforts in the direction of no-fault would be misplaced. And, in Part
IV, I propose ways to reinvigorate section 2 through an evolution of
law and policy, arguing that these alternatives may be more con-
structive than drastic measures such as a no-fault approach, or a
complete overhaul of the consumer welfare standard.
I. THE NO-FAULT MONOPOLIZATION MOVEMENT, 1969-1980
The no-fault monopolization movement is generally dated from
1969 to 1980,38 although some intellectuals had spoken much earlier
against big business.39 For example, Louis D. Brandeis, a fierce
champion of small businesses, had written extensively in the early
1900s about the economic, social, and political dangers of “bigness”
and about the moral value of small independent businesses.40 Nobel
Laureate George Stigler, likewise, was concerned about big business
38. See First, supra note 19, at 58 (dating the period from 1969 to 1979); Kovacic, supra
note 16, at 1119-20 (dating the period from 1969 to 1982).
39. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS 114 (Osmond K. Fraenkel ed., Kennikat Press 1965) (1934) (arguing in his various
writings that no monopoly in the United States was “attained by efficiency alone” or “so
superior to its competitors ... as to enable it to control the market solely by reason of its
superiority”); CARL KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND
LEGAL ANALYSIS 260-65 (1959) (calling for the restructuring of concentrated industries
through new antitrust legislation); HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY
246-49 (1948); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 589
(1953) (arguing in favor of a presumption of illegal monopoly power for firms with “more than
10 or 15 percent” market share). As is well known, however, Bowman later changed his views
on concentration quite drastically. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The
Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 368 (1965).
40. See generally BRANDEIS, supra note 39.
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and had embraced a no-fault vision of antitrust in 1952,41 although
he had retreated from his views even before the start of the
movement.42 No-fault language was also evident in some Supreme
Court monopolization opinions authored by Justice William O.
Douglas, who wrote in United States v. Griffith that “monopoly
power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself consti-
tute an evil and stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains
unexercised.”43
Critical boosts for the no-fault monopolization idea came in the
1960s with the endorsements of several leading antitrust thinkers,
including Donald F. Turner, Oliver E. Williamson, and Phillip E.
Areeda. An antitrust icon of his time, Turner argued in 1969 that a
firm should be found to have unlawfully monopolized a market if its
power “has persisted over a long enough time to indicate relatively
impervious barriers to entry, regardless of how it was obtained or
maintained, excepting only monopoly based on economies of scale”
or on patents.44 A few years later, Williamson likewise emphasized
“the problem of continued dominance of an industry by a single firm
which has obtained its position by lawful means.”45 He described
that circumstance as a form of “market failure,” and called for “gov-
ernment intervention to upset this condition.”46 Areeda’s support of
41. George J. Stigler, The Case Against Big Business, FORTUNE, May 1952, at 123, 164,
167 (“The Sherman Act ... cannot cope effectively with the problem posed by big business....
The dissolution of big businesses is ... necessary to increase the support for a private,
competitive enterprise economy, and reverse the drift toward government control.”).
42. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, MEMOIRS OF AN UNREGULATED ECONOMIST 97-99 (1988)
(explaining that until the 1950s, he “was an aggressive critic of big business,” sharing the
prevailing view of economists then that “monopoly posed a major problem in public policy ...
and that it should be dealt with boldly by breaking up dominant firms”).
43. 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); see also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 543 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (warning that big business is an “anathema to the
American antitrust dream” and that concentration of power “leads predictably to socialism
that is antagonistic to our system”); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36
(1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (speaking strongly against the “problem of bigness” and
speaking of antitrust as a way to ensure that power is “scattered into many hands so that the
fortunes of the people will not be dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices,
the emotional stability of a few self-appointed men”).
44. Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1207, 1220-21 (1969).
45. Oliver E. Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure
Considerations, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1512 (1972) (footnote omitted).
46. Id. at 1514-16.
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no-fault monopolization was evident as well, writing that “[t]he evils
of monopoly are largely independent of the manner in which it is
achieved or maintained,”47 and urging an approach that tackles
“monopoly status” rather than searches for exclusionary practices.48
Their views and those of other like-minded antitrust scholars of
the time49 were apparently very much influenced by the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm that had dominated economic
and antitrust thinking from the 1940s through the 1970s.50
Introduced by Edward S. Mason51 and developed by Joe S. Bain,52
this economic paradigm posits that market structure strongly in-
fluences or determines conduct, and conduct, in turn, strongly af-
fects market performance.53 Under this framework, knowing the
structure of a market would allow one to predict conduct and
performance. And if, as the model predicts, concentrated markets
likely result in anticompetitive conduct, which, in turn, likely re-
sults in poor performance (such as inefficiency), then a no-fault
agenda could make sense. Under this theory, more likely than not,
the existence of persistent market power would be accompanied by
anticompetitive conduct and inefficiencies.54 In that event, finding
liability based on evidence of substantial market power, without
47. 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 35 (1978); see also Gray Dorsey, Free Enterprise vs. the
Entrepreneur: Redefining the Entities Subject to the Antitrust Laws, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1244,
1248 (1977).
48. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 47, at 63-67 (proposing a no-fault monopoly policy); see
also Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI.
L. REV. 567, 575-76 (1947) (arguing against focusing on conduct that improperly excludes
rivals, and in favor of “regarding as illegal the kind of economic power which the economist
regards as monopolistic”).
49. See Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1137 n.202 (listing some of the literature on no-fault
theories of section 2 liability).
50. See Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94
MINN. L. REV. 311, 350-67 (2009) (discussing the SCP paradigm, its history, and its decline).
51. See generally Edward S. Mason, Price and Production Policies of Large-Scale
Enterprise, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 61 (1939).
52. See generally JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956).
53. See generally Peter C. Carstensen, Antitrust Law and the Paradigm of Industrial
Organization, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 487, 492-504 (1983); Leonard W. Weiss, The Structure-
Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1105 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Rostow, supra note 48, at 568 (“There is a great deal of evidence, in fact, that
on the whole Big Business is less efficient, less progressive technically, and relatively less
profitable than smaller business.”).
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having to identify and analyze a monopolist’s alleged bad act, is
unlikely to sacrifice efficiencies.55
With the backing of antitrust luminaries of the day, a number of
no-fault initiatives were considered on the political front during this
period. The first involved the 1969 expansive recommendations of
the Neal Task Force—President Lyndon Johnson’s Task Force on
Antitrust Policy—to adopt no-fault monopolization liability theories
and otherwise restructure industries deemed overly concentrated.56
A few years later, Senator Philip Hart introduced a no-fault mo-
nopolization bill, the Monopolization Reform Act of 1976, which
would have removed the conduct requirement in section 2 cases
brought by the United States.57 Between 1972 and 1975, Senator
Hart introduced the Industrial Reorganization Act in successive
Congresses which, if passed, would have imposed no-fault monopoli-
zation liability not only for a single corporation in possession of
monopoly power, but also for oligopolies that collectively held such
power.58 Finally, the National Commission for the Review of Anti-
trust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP), appointed by President
Jimmy Carter,59 submitted its Report in 1979 recommending that
Congress consider amending section 2 to establish liability for no-
fault monopolization for “persistent monopoly power.”60
While none of these efforts succeeded, as noted, they had enjoyed
the support of many of the leading antitrust scholars of the day,61
except Robert Bork62 and economist George Stigler, who by then had
already changed his earlier deconcentration views.63 Many of these
55. See, e.g., id. (writing that deconcentration would “eliminate the wastes, the non-use
of capacity, and the restrictionism of monopolistic industrial organization”).
56. See PHIL C. NEAL ET AL., REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE ON ANTITRUST
POLICY (1969), reprinted in ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968-69, at 11, 14-15, 65-76.
57. S. 3429, 94th Cong., 122 CONG. REC. 13871 (1976). The bill received no hearings.
58. See, e.g., S. 1167, 93d Cong., 119 CONG. REC. 7319 (1973).
59. Arthur D. Austin, National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures: Reports on Symptoms but Ignores Causes, 54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 873, 873 (1979).
60. NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL vi-ix (1979).
61. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
62. See Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1137 nn.200 & 202 (noting that of the academic
members on the Neal Task Force, only Robert Bork dissented, and that those who testified
in favor of no-fault monopolization before the NCRALP included Phillip Areeda, Walter
Adams, Harvey Goldschmid, Louis Schwartz, and Oliver Williamson).
63. Testifying before Congress in 1969, Stigler said of the Neal Task Force
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supporters, however, later retracted their endorsements with the
ascendance of a new body of economic literature that seriously
challenged the SCP theories.64 Broadly speaking, this new body of
scholarship argued that economies of scale are much more substan-
tial, and firms in concentrated markets behave more competitively,
than had been assumed.65 This effectively eroded the SCP assump-
tion that persistent monopoly power was likely attributable to
exclusionary conduct, not superior conduct or economies of scale.66
The reversal of course by these intellectuals when the SCP theory
faced severe challenge suggests that the no-fault movement, even in
that “big is bad” era which Harry First has called “Woodstock anti-
trust,” was not wholly a populist reaction against bigness and its
perceived political and social harms. Rather, it was at least partially
based on assumptions, rooted in the SCP model, that relatively little
would be lost and much would be gained economically by taking a
no-fault approach.
recommendations to adopt no-fault monopolization liabilities theories and other
deconcentration measures:
I personally have serious misgivings about the Neal proposals for
deconcentration. I worry about the fact that where we have substantial large
economies of scale, deconcentration puts burdens on us. Where the economies
are not large, private rivals have a tendency to enter and eliminate (excess)
profits themselves.... There was a time ... when I was enthusiastic for
[deconcentration] scheme[s]. I no longer am.
Yale Brozen, The Concentration-Collusion Doctrine, 46 ANTITRUST L.J. 826, 828 n.8 (1977);
see also supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
64. See Brozen, supra note 63, at 826-29, 828 n.8 (summarizing some commentators’
withdrawal of support for deconcentration policies); Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1138.
65. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
163-97 (1978) (synthesizing the theories and arguments refuting the assumptions of SCP);
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE
NEW LEARNING 164, 179 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al. eds., 1974) (“Since persistent market
concentration seems to be associated with economies of scale or other forms of superior
performance by existing larger firms in concentrated industries, a move to deconcentrate such
industries is very likely to increase, not decrease, cost.... Embracing the market concentration
doctrine through legislation is thus very likely to penalize the success and superior
performance upon which depends the progress and wealth of this nation.”); Sam Peltzman,
The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J.L. & ECON. 229, 229-31 (1977)
(refuting the assumptions of SCP).
66. See Demsetz, supra note 65, at 181; Peltzman, supra note 65, at 262.
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II. THE AGE OF DIGITAL PLATFORM MARKETS AND NEW BRANDEIS
I discuss below the digital platform markets, including an
analysis of the economic characteristics of those markets (such as
network effects) that have contributed to their incumbents’ endur-
ing dominance. This, in turn, explains the increasing overall
dissatisfaction with the limitations of section 2, and the rise of the
New Brandeis critics and their renewed interest in no-fault monop-
olization. I begin the Part, however, with relevant insights on the
current conservative antitrust period in order to provide context to
the discussion.
A. Conservative Antitrust from 1980
The early 1980s marked the end of Woodstock antitrust and the
beginning of what is generally considered the “modern,” or conserva-
tive, antitrust era. Influenced by scholarship suggesting that
differentiating between procompetitive and anticompetitive conduct
is very difficult (because conduct that excludes competitors often
also benefits consumers by enhancing efficiency),67 courts and
antitrust agencies worried about committing false positives—that
is, mistaking procompetitive practices for anticompetitive exclu-
sion.68 The concerns were that false positives would have lasting
effects,69 chill innovation, and discourage other procompetitive
practices, thereby depriving consumers of benefits they would have
enjoyed otherwise.70 In contrast, false negatives were seen as posing
67. See Frank H. Easterbrook, When Is It Worthwhile to Use Courts to Search for
Exclusionary Conduct?, 2003 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 345, 345 (arguing that, because of the
benefits of aggressive competition and the difficulty of predicting when competition will
become exclusionary, courts should be wary of finding antitrust violations).
68. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
414 (2004) (“Under the best of circumstances, applying the requirements of § 2 ‘can be
difficult’ because ‘the means of illicit exclusion, like the means of legitimate competition, are
myriad.’” (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001))).
69. Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 2 (“If the court errs by condemning a beneficial
practice, the benefits may be lost for good. Any other firm that uses the condemned practice
faces sanctions in the name of stare decisis, no matter the benefits.”).
70. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (“Mistaken inferences and the resulting false
condemnations ‘are especially costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws
are designed to protect’.... The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of
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more fleeting harms because markets were assumed to be robust
and to quickly self-correct.71 Thus, the trend toward antitrust
caution with respect to section 2 and tolerance toward dominant
firm conduct began, and talk of no-fault theories ceased.72
During this period, consistent with the desire to minimize false
positives, courts adopted demanding standards and burdens of proof
designed to err on the side of noninterference with dominant firm
conduct.73 The “consumer welfare” paradigm, first endorsed by the
Supreme Court in 1979,74 became the framework on which modern
antitrust is now based.75 While consumer welfare has no uniform or
even clear definition in antitrust,76 it is generally understood to
mean that antitrust liability requires finding that the alleged bad
conduct caused or is likely to cause consumer harm,77 which could
include not only higher prices or reduced output, but also quality
§ 2 liability.” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594
(1986))).
71. Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 2 (“If the court errs by permitting a deleterious
practice, though, the welfare loss decreases over time. Monopoly is self-destructive. Monopoly
prices eventually attract entry.”).
72. This cautious approach to section 2 is epitomized in Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414 (stressing
the need to avoid costly harms of false condemnations, which “chill the very conduct the
antitrust laws are designed to protect” (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co, 475 U.S. 594 )).
See also Baker, supra note 2, at 527-28 (“Exclusionary conduct is commonly relegated to the
periphery in contemporary antitrust discourse.... Antitrust commentators associated with the
Chicago School have long expressed deep skepticism about exclusion as an antitrust theory,
particularly as applied to dominant firm conduct.” (internal citations omitted)).
73. See sources cited supra note 21; see also Eleanor M. Fox, What Is Harm to
Competition? Exclusionary Practices and Anticompetitive Effect, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 371, 378
(2002) (describing the Chicago School approach as one of “non-intervention unless market
conduct was provably inefficient, and ‘inefficient’ was to be given the following narrowest-
possible meaning: the conduct must confer market power that would be used to limit output
of the product or service, and the conduct must not be justifiable as an attempt to serve the
market”).
74. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
75. Today, the main debate concerning the consumer welfare standard is whether the
“consumer surplus” or the “total surplus” standard should be applied. See generally Steven
C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The
True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336 (2010).
76. See Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L.
& ECON. 133, 137-38 (2011) (observing that “consumer welfare” is not a clearly defined term
in antitrust, though it has a clear definition in economics).
77. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION
2 (2005) (“The only articulated goal of the antitrust laws is to benefit consumers, who are best
off when markets are competitive.”).
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harms and dynamic harms such as diminished innovation.78 The
term “consumer” in consumer welfare, however, is more or less a
term of art that could include intermediate buyers79 as well as
suppliers,80 neither of which are consumers in the literal sense. In
this respect, the standard is not as constricted legally as many
believe.81
Accepting the premise that antitrust law is for the protection of
competition not competitors82—as the Supreme Court stated long
ago83—consumer welfare is in theory a relatively sound concept, as
it is designed to filter out conduct that is ultimately harmless to
consumers. In practice, however, because nonprice effects are un-
quantifiable and often unmeasurable, proof is very difficult to
establish,84 and, for reasons to be discussed later, the difficulties are
compounded in digital platform markets.85 Along with the demand-
ing burdens of proof imposed on plaintiffs, this has led to a tilting
of antitrust law and policy against antitrust enforcement, partic-
ularly in the section 2 context.86 A backlash against the highly
78. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
79. This is self-evident from the “direct purchaser” rule, which restricts the recovery of
damages in an antitrust action to a direct purchaser, even if the direct purchaser passes on
the higher costs resulting from the seller’s anticompetitive conduct to the indirect purchasers
(the direct purchaser’s customers). Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729, 735 (1977). The
doctrine obviously would not exist if intermediate buyers were not considered “consumers”
who could be harmed by antitrust violations.
80. See, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235
(1948) (holding that purchasers’ conspiracy to fix the prices they paid to sugar beet sellers
violated the Sherman Act, just as a conspiracy of sellers to fix the prices they charge buyers
would constitute a violation).
81. See Marina Lao, Strengthening Antitrust Enforcement Within the Consumer Welfare
Rubric, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Nov. 2019, at 32-34 (discussing the misperceptions of the
consumer welfare paradigm).
82. Even Robert Pitofsky, an antitrust progressive and former Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission during the Clinton administration, seemed to agree. See Robert Pitofsky,
The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1058 (1979) (stating that “protec-
tion for small businessmen against the rigors of competition” is not a proper antitrust
concern).
83. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
84. See infra text accompanying note 139 (discussing the fundamental concepts of
consumer welfare).
85. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C.1.
86. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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permissive approach toward dominant firms and market power was
probably inevitable in this age of large digital platforms.87
We are now in a populist period, where concerns are running high
about big business and especially the immense economic power of
the largest technology platforms.88 Now, as in the no-fault move-
ment in the 1970s, critics frustrated with the limitations of tradi-
tional antitrust enforcement are exploring ideas, including no-fault
monopolization theories, for dispersing uncomfortable levels of
concentration.89
B. Dominance of the Largest Digital Platforms: Network and
Lock-in Effects, Enhanced by Personal Data
The dominance of the largest digital technology platforms in their
respective core areas, and the breadth of their activities across
markets, is undisputed. For example, Google’s search engine han-
dles approximately 88 percent of all general Internet searches
worldwide;90 Amazon garners 82 percent of e-book sales91 and 45
percent of all e-commerce retail sales in the United States;92 and
Facebook is by far the most popular social network.93 Additionally,
87. Bill Kovacic (later Chairman of the FTC in President George W. Bush’s
administration) said thirty years ago that “deconcentration constitutes antitrust’s cyclical
response to eras of permissiveness in the treatment of market power, whether gained through
single-firm conduct or through consolidation,” and he presciently predicted that the pendulum
would likely swing back to a renewed political interest in and discussion of the “persistent”
monopoly problem and various deconcentration measures. Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1149.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
89. See, e.g., supra notes 18, 25-26 and accompanying text.
90. Search Engine Market Share Worldwide 2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/216573/worldwide-market-share-of-search-engines/ [https://perma.cc/CSD2-5TAJ].
91. February 2017 Big, Bad, Wide & International Report: Covering Amazon, Apple, B&N,
and Kobo Ebook Sales in the US, UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, AUTHOREARN-
INGS.COM, https://web.archive.org/web/20190218084936/http:/authorearnings.com/report/
february-2017 [https://perma.cc/U54J-NVQB].
92. Projected Retail E-Commerce GMV of Share of Amazon in the United States from 2016
to 2021, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/788109/amazon-retail-market-share-
usa/ [https://perma.cc/N8EZ-WWRB].
93. As of July 2019, Facebook had 72.12 percent of the worldwide social media market,
Social Media Stats Worldwide: July 2018-July 2019, STATCOUNTER, http://gs.statcounter.com/
social-media-stats [https://perma.cc/TH8V-QLKF], and 50.86 percent of the U.S. social media
market. Social Media Stats United States of America: July 2018-July 2019, STATCOUNTER,
http://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/all/united-states-of-america [https://perma.cc/
TBF6-2EJV].
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Google and Facebook together have a 56.8 percent market share of
all revenues received nationally from digital advertising,94 though
Amazon is rapidly gaining market share on them.95 Further, each
of these companies has expanded into multiple other business
sectors as well, either through internal growth or acquisitions, and
the breadth and scale of their activities are staggering.96
A policy dilemma that confronts antitrust policymakers sorting
through the dominance issues of these firms is that, on the one
hand, the platforms have benefited consumers immensely,97 and
their conduct in gaining or enhancing their dominance is not
necessarily unlawful under monopolization doctrine.98 On the other
94. Daniel Liberto, Facebook, Google Digital Ad Market Share Drops as Amazon Climbs,
INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/news/facebook-google-digital-ad-
market-share-drops-amazon-climbs/ [https://perma.cc/HDT8-YL33].
95. Julie Creswell, Amazon Sets Its Sights on the $88 Billion Online Ad Market, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/business/media/amazon-digital-
ads.html [https://perma.cc/3MXD-ZNPM].
96. For example, in addition to its search engine, Alphabet, Google’s parent company, also
offers email (Gmail), video (YouTube), an Internet browser (Chrome), an operating system for
mobile (Android), mapping (Google Maps), and numerous other products and services. Our
Products, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/about/products/ [https://perma.cc/D7TM-DDHF];
see also Nicolas Petit, Technology Giants, the “Moligopoly” Hypothesis and Holistic
Competition: A Primer 16-17 (Oct. 20, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2856502 [https://perma.cc/665A-28Q2] (listing all the market lines of Google, Apple,
Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft).
97. Even the harshest critics of the largest tech platforms acknowledge, if grudgingly,
their benefits to consumers. See Khan, supra note 9, at 714 (conceding that consumers
“universally seem to love the company” and adding that Amazon was ranked “the most
reputable company in America” in 2016 for the third consecutive year); id. at 716
(acknowledging that Amazon “has so clearly delivered enormous benefits to consumers—not
to mention revolutionized e-commerce in general”); A Giant Problem: The Rise of the Corporate
Colossus Threatens Both Competition and the Legitimacy of Business, ECONOMIST (Sept. 17,
2016), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/09/17/a-giant-problem [https://perma.cc/DTX4-
YB9G] (“[T]he superstars are admirable in many ways. They churn out products that improve
consumers’ lives, from smarter smartphones to sharper televisions. They provide Americans
and Europeans with an estimated $280 billion-worth of ‘free’ services—such as search or
directions—a year.”).
98. European competition authorities have been much more aggressive toward dominant
American digital platform companies. In a decision in 2017, the European Commission found
that Google had abused its dominance in preferring its own comparison shopping results over
its competitors’ services in its display of search results in response to users’ shopping-related
inquiries and imposed an unprecedented fine of €2.42 billion. European Commission Press
Release IP/17/1784, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing Dominance
as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service (June
27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/N9BR-
L2BU]. In a second decision in 2018, also against Google, European competition enforcers
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hand, their business practices, lawful or unlawful, may suppress
innovation in the long run and slow economic growth.99 The concern
is that if there is no meaningful competition, these tech giants may
become less innovative in the future, to the detriment of con-
sumers.100 Adding to the dilemma is the important role network and
lock-in effects, enhanced by data, play in entrenching the power of
some of the largest digital platforms in their respective areas of
dominance and in strengthening entry barriers.101
Yet simply taking advantage of the inherent competitive benefits
of network and lock-in effects is not improper conduct under
section 2,102 nor are these effects necessarily anticompetitive. In fact,
they often provide efficiencies that benefit consumers.103 Network
effects refer to the rise of a platform’s value to each individual user
as the number of users increases.104 Facebook, for example, becomes
concluded that Google had abused its dominance by bundling some of its apps on Android, its
mobile operating system, and imposed yet another record fine of €4.34 billion. European
Commission Press Release IP/18/4581, Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion for
Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices to Strengthen Dominance of Google’s
Search Engine (July 18, 2018), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/TN9K-6FVB]. Commentary on these decisions in the United States has been
quite harsh, with criticism focusing primarily on the lack of consumer harm. See, e.g., Julian
Morris, The European Commission’s Google Android Decision Takes a Mistaken, Ahistorical
View of the Smartphone Market, TRUTHONTHEMARKET.COM (July 23, 2018), https://truthonthe
market.com/2018/07/23/the-european-commissions-google-android-decision-takes-a-mistaken-
ahistorical-view-of-the-smartphone-market/ [https://perma.cc/Q3JN-2HPB] (quoting FTC
Chairman Joseph Simons who said: “Once [the European Commission] find that a company
is dominant ... that imposes upon the company kind of like a fairness obligation irrespective
of what the effect is on the consumer. Our regulatory ... our antitrust regime requires that
there be a harm to consumer welfare—so the consumer has to be injured—so the two tests are
a little bit different”).
99. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Maurice Stucke & Allen Grunes, Dancing Around Data, THE HILL (Dec. 10,
2014, 11:30 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/226502-dancing-around-
data [https://perma.cc/Q5TC-K397].
101. See, e.g., Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for
the Internet, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1682-83 (2013) (discussing entrenchment of dominant
digital platforms through network effects and switching costs). For an overview of antitrust
analysis of multisided digital platform markets, see generally David S. Evans & Richard
Schmalensee, The Antitrust Analysis of Multisided Platform Businesses, in 1 OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 404 (Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol eds.,
2015).
102. Lao, supra note 13, at 512-14.
103. See Shelanski, supra note 101, at 1686.
104. Id. at 1682.
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more attractive to each user as more people join the network, since
there are more friends with whom the user can interact. A platform
might benefit too from indirect network effects when third parties
produce a variety of attractive complementary products, which in-
crease the utility of the platform and draw more users to it.105
These effects are further magnified by the importance of con-
sumer data to digital platforms and by the largest platforms’ huge
data advantage over their smaller rivals.106 Platforms collect mil-
lions of scraps of personal data from consumers visiting their sites.
For advertisement-supported platforms such as Facebook and
Google, for example, the more user data that is collected, the better
advertising can be targeted to individual users,107 which leads to
higher advertising revenues, which supports further investments in
quality improvements, which attracts more users, and so on.108 A
smaller rival or potential rival platform, without comparable
mounds of personal data, would be at a significant competitive
disadvantage.109
A platform’s organic growth of data—collecting, mining, synthe-
sizing, and using that data—however, is generally not considered
exclusionary conduct under section 2, even though it may indeed
increase entry barriers.110 Moreover, it is impossible to categorically
105. Id. at 1683.
106. See, e.g., Stucke & Grunes, supra note 100 (arguing that the tech giants significantly
outpace their rivals in the amount of big data they possess, which entrenches their power).
107. See Andres V. Lerner, The Role of “Big Data” in Online Platform Competition 39
(Aug. 26, 2014), https://ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2482780 [https://perma.cc/
5QJ6-WVYQ].
108. Lao, supra note 13, at 503.
109. Some commentators disagree with this view and point to the successes of some
platform start-ups with no data that nevertheless managed to enter and topple established
incumbents (which had data)—the most famous examples being Facebook’s and Google’s
displacement of MySpace and Yahoo! respectively. See Anja Lambrecht & Catherine E.
Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm from Competition? 14 (Dec. 18, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2705530 [https://perma.cc/UD8V-86WH]; see also Geoffrey
A. Manne & R. Ben Sperry, The Problems and Perils of Bootstrapping Privacy and Data into
an Antitrust Framework, CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., May 2015, at 2, 9-10 (asserting that entry
barriers into online markets are low and network effects are weak because of the absence of
switching costs and lock-in, among other reasons); D. Daniel Sokol & Roisin Comerford,
Antitrust and Regulating Big Data, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1129, 1136 (2016); Darren S.
Tucker & Hill B. Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data, 14 ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec.
2014, at 1, 7 (arguing that user data is ubiquitous, cheap, nonrivalrous, and easily accessible,
and therefore not an entry barrier).
110. See Lao, supra note 13, at 512-13 (discussing the various antitrust issues animating
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describe the effects as anticompetitive, as data can help platforms
deliver substantial consumer benefits. For example, search engines
can improve on their search results for search terms going forward
by learning from users’ past “click-and-query” data (that is, users’
actual clicks on the displayed search results for the relevant search
term).111 Thus, Google, the dominant search engine, is able to
greatly enhance the quality of its search results relative to that of
smaller search engines, because it has more data from more search
activity with which to train its algorithms.
For platforms that are not primarily advertisement-supported,
such as Amazon, the effects of data are similarly mixed, and it is
also not clear that the organic growth and use of such data is im-
proper. There is little doubt, for example, that having large bodies
of user data relating to consumers’ browsing practices helps Amazon
identify an individual’s buying patterns and cater better to his or
her needs.112 Knowing the items users searched for and immediately
bought, or searched for but did not find, or found but did not buy, or
items they placed in their baskets but wavered on buying for some
time, or knowing how long their mouses hovered over various items,
obviously gives the company valuable relevant information with
which to improve its services.
Critics are correct that huge data advantages effectively protect
dominant incumbent platforms from competition and serve as entry
barriers, thereby further entrenching the incumbent’s market
power.113 However, relying on personal data collected on its own
platform, without more, is not improper conduct. Equally important,
relying on data to better serve customers is a consumer benefit, not
a consumer harm.114 This reality highlights the futility of attempt-
ing to categorically characterize the competitive effects of big data
the big-data debate).
111. See id. at 509.
112. See Sokol & Comerford, supra note 109, at 1135.
113. See Lao, supra note 13, at 508-10 (analyzing the procompetitive and anticompetitive
potential of big data); Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control
of User Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 405-07, 420-23, 426 (2014) (arguing that it is difficult
for the established platforms’ rivals, who do not have consumer data initially, to monetize
data so as to compete with the incumbents). See generally STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 12,
at 36-42 (commenting on the competitive significance of big data).
114. See Sokol & Comerford, supra note 109, at 1129, 1134-35.
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as either procompetitive or anticompetitive.115 It underscores as well
the challenge policymakers face in deciding when and how to use
antitrust law to protect consumers without causing more harm than
good through inappropriate interference.
C. The New Brandeis Frustration with Section 2 Doctrine
While many commentators have been critical of the narrow
interpretation of section 2 since the 1980s,116 enhanced anxiety over
the size of the largest tech companies has contributed to the rise of
a genre of commentaries that more frontally challenge the antitrust
enterprise.117 This group of critiques, which has gained some polit-
ical traction,118 has been labeled collectively as New Brandeis
antitrust.119 Defining New Brandeis would be very difficult—and I
shall not attempt to do so here—since those loosely identified with
the group hold a variety of views on different issues, including on
the antitrust reforms they deem necessary to keep the largest tech-
nology platforms in check. Several common threads run through
their commentaries, though. They include a strong distrust of eco-
nomic power generally,120 and of the power of the largest technology
115. See Lao, supra note 13, at 508-09.
116. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 236-37;
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 742-43.
117. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
118. See Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017, S. 1812, 115th
Cong. (2017) (bill introduced by Sen. Amy Klobuchar to raise the bar for merger approvals;
the bill has not had a hearing); Alexis C. Madrigal, A Silicon Valley Congressman Takes on
Amazon, ATLANTIC (June 19, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/06/
ro-khanna-amazon-whole-foods/530805/ [https://perma.cc/S2M5-EQ4R] (reporting on Con-
gressman Ro Khanna’s view that Congress should look into “reorient[ing] antitrust policy to
consider all the factors of economic concentration,” including not just consumer price, but also
“the loss of jobs, the impact on wages, the impact on local small businesses, and the impact
on innovation within an industry”); Warren, supra note 18 (putting forth a proposal to pass
legislation that would break up Amazon, Facebook, Google).
119. See sources cited supra note 25 (listing some of the New Brandeis writings); see also
A. Douglas Melamed & Nicolas Petit, The Misguided Assault on the Consumer Welfare Stan-
dard in the Age of Platform Markets, 54 REV. INDUS. ORG. 741, 744 n.7 (2019) (listing those
commentators who are generally considered part of the New Brandeis group). See generally
Medvedovsky, supra note 24, at 41-46 (giving a short account of the rise of New Brandeis, or
“hipster antitrust”).
120. The label “New Brandeis” comes from this distrust of bigness, for which Louis
Brandeis was well known. See Barak Orbach & Grace Campbell Rebling, The Antitrust Curse
of Bigness, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 624-30 (2012) (covering thoroughly Brandeis’s concern with
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companies in particular;121 a shared belief that antitrust law should
have a broader mission than that of promoting consumer welfare;122
and the related belief that current antitrust law, even if aggres-
sively enforced, would not achieve that broader mission, thus
requiring an overhaul of the antitrust laws.123
1. The Conduct Requirement and the Consumer Welfare
Standard
Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not combat “bigness” (or sheer
size), nor does it prohibit even significant market power in a
relevant market, absent some sort of exclusionary conduct.124
Exclusionary conduct generally refers to practices inconsistent with
legitimate competition that protects or increases a firm’s monopoly
“bigness”).
121. See, e.g., WU, supra note 2, at 21 (arguing that tech giants’ power seems to “transcend
the narrowly economic,” and that they “know too much about us, and seem[ ] to have too much
power over what we see, hear, do, and even feel”); Barry C. Lynn, America’s Monopolies Are
Holding Back the Economy, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/ 2017/02/antimonopoly-big-business/514358/ [https://perma.cc/VL4U-JXXL].
Some New Brandeis commentators seem to treat immense economic power as monopoly
power, though in antitrust law, monopoly power has a different meaning. See generally Khan,
supra note 9 (focusing broadly on Amazon’s immense economic power but never quite
identifying in which relevant markets the company has substantial market power).
122. See Khan, supra note 9, at 739-43 (arguing that the antitrust laws were intended to
serve various interests, including “diversity and access to markets,” that “[f]ocusing antitrust
exclusively on consumer welfare [wa]s a mistake,” and that the aims of antitrust included “the
protection of producers and consumers from monopoly abuse, and the dispersion of political
and economic control” (internal citations omitted)); Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market
Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37-
41 (2014) (arguing that economics is overemphasized in antitrust and that political theory
should take precedence); Vaheesan, supra note 25, at 991-94 (arguing that the goals of
antitrust are broader than consumer welfare, and that the consumer welfare standard also
does not fully take into account corporate power); Tim Wu, Opinion, Be Afraid of Economic
‘Bigness.’ Be Very Afraid, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/10/
opinion/sunday/fascism-economy-monopoly.html [https://perma.cc/Q8PX-WFBA] (contending
that “bigness” poses threats to democracy and creates conditions conducive to dictatorship,
which antitrust law fails to take into account).
123. See generally Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 236-37, 266, 268. This perception
parallels some of the sentiments that existed in the big-is-bad era. See Stigler, supra note 41,
at 164 (“The Sherman Act is admirable in dealing with formal conspiracies of many firms, but
... it cannot cope effectively with the problem posed by big business.”).
124. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
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power by excluding or weakening the firm’s rivals.125 Significantly,
not all conduct that might harm a competitor is captured under
section 2.126
Notably, simply taking advantage of scale economies and network
effects (essentially a form of scale economies), or engaging in
internal growth and expansion, is generally not considered unlawful
conduct, even if it has the effect of impeding entry or meaningful
competition from actual or potential rivals.127 Thus, for example, it
is certainly correct that the more users gravitate to Facebook, the
greater the value of Facebook is to its users, which attracts more
users.128 The increase in Facebook’s user base then allows it to
collect more consumer data, which attracts more online advertisers
who are able to serve better targeted advertisements to individual
users.129 This provides greater advertising revenues to Facebook,
allowing the company to further improve and expand its products,
attracting still more users, and so on.130 While this network and
feedback effects phenomenon indicates that entry barriers are high
in digital platform markets, it does not necessarily describe un-
lawful conduct.
As to user lock-in, a complaint from critics of the largest plat-
forms is that each tech giant has built its own ecosystem, and
entices users to stay within it.131 In the case of Facebook, for
example, it is said that the network’s architecture, combined with
125. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Standard for Unlawful Exclusionary
Conduct 9 n.18, 25 (June 6, 2008) (unpublished manuscript on file at Faculty Scholarship at
Penn Law), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2779&context=
faculty_scholarship [https://perma.cc/G2LV-ANM2].
126. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.
127. See id. at 407-08.
128. This fits the classic definition of network effects—the value of Facebook to each
individual user grows as an increasing number of consumers uses the social media platform,
because the individual user then derives more value from it by having more “friends” with
whom she can communicate. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
129. See Lao, supra note 13, at 503, 509.
130. See id.
131. See Allen P. Grunes & Maurice E. Stucke, No Mistake About It: The Important Role
of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, ANTITRUST SOURCE, April 2015, at 1, 8 (“Businesses
develop strategies to exploit switching costs and lock-in, whether it is the investment of time
needed to learn to use a platform, the number of complementary products such as apps that
are available, or the fact that most of one’s friends are on Facebook. Indeed, it may be more
difficult to move a consumer away from a ‘free’ good or service than one that he or she pays
for.”).
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network effects, discourages users from switching: their friends are
all on Facebook, and they have spent time posting photographs and
otherwise building a presence on the network.132 The high switching
costs then create a lock-in effect and raise entry barriers into the
relevant markets.133 Although these observations are substantially
true, tempting users to stay within an ecosystem by expanding
offerings and adding or improving features, however, can hardly be
considered improper conduct.
Identifying exclusionary conduct and making a case for consumer
harm is similarly difficult with respect to Amazon. Carl Shapiro,
who is sympathetic to the general need for stronger antitrust
enforcement, nevertheless said of a New Brandeis critique:
[One] must describe the specific conduct that concerns them and
explain how that conduct disrupts the competitive process and
harms customers. Simply saying that Amazon has grown like a
weed, charges very low prices, and has driven many smaller
retailers out of business is not sufficient. Where is the consumer
harm?134
Herbert Hovenkamp similarly noted that “[o]ne cannot simply la-
ment that Amazon has grown too large,” but must “identify[ ] what
exactly Amazon is doing that should be remedied and what those
remedies should look like” when clearly customers are not com-
plaining.135
Furthermore, under the consumer welfare standard on which
contemporary antitrust is based, the conduct must have “anti-
competitive effect”—that is, it must not only exclude rivals but must
harm consumers or “harm the competitive process and thereby harm
consumers.”136 “Consumer welfare,” long accepted as the lodestone
132. See id.
133. See id. at 8-9.
134. Shapiro, supra note 3, at 743.
135. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Is Antitrust’s Consumer Welfare Principle Imperiled?, J. CORP.
L. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 32) (on file at Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law), https://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2987&context=faculty_scholarship
[https://perma.cc/QJ6E-QDQE].
136. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Timothy J.
Muris, The FTC and the Law of Monopolization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 693, 694 (2000) (“Recent
Supreme Court pronouncements have confirmed that no matter how bad a firm’s conduct is,
or how injurious to rivals, there can be no Section 2 violation without injury to competition.”).
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in antitrust analysis,137 curiously has no real definition in antitrust
law, but has been variously interpreted.138 Under the narrow,
orthodox, Chicago-School interpretation championed by Robert
Bork, consumer welfare is almost synonymous with allocative
efficiency, and, thus, only practices that artificially restrict output
are deemed to harm consumers.139 The more mainstream view,
however, is broader and simply asks if the practice harms competi-
tion and ultimately makes consumers worse off.
Contrary to common critiques of the standard, the measure of
consumer harm is not limited to price or output effects.140 Diminish-
ment of quality, choice, or innovation alone would qualify as
consumer harm as well because these factors clearly impact
consumer welfare.141 However, unlike price, nonprice harms are
usually unquantifiable and difficult to measure.142 And, because
plaintiffs normally carry the burden of proof, successful challenges
to dominant firm conduct absent price effects have been rare in
practice. Thus, as applied, the “consumer welfare” standard does
tend to focus on price effects.
Certain characteristics of many digital markets compound the
difficulty of showing consumer harm. Consumers do not pay a mone-
tary price to use social media, search engines, e-mail, or many other
popular platform products; instead, the advertising side of the
platforms pays for the opportunity to serve targeted advertising to
individual users (made possible by the volumes of personal data the
platforms collect from them).143 If price were functionally the only
measure of harm, then showing adverse effects of any alleged
exclusionary conduct would indeed be extremely difficult.144 When
137. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE
ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66 (1978)).
138. See Orbach, supra note 76, at 163-64.
139. See BORK, supra note 65, at 90-160 (discussing the neoclassical efficiency model’s
assumption that only practices that artificially restrict output are economically inefficient).
140. Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation,
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 602 (2007).
141. In fact, there is general agreement that innovation is more important to economic
growth than price competition. See, e.g., Shelanski, supra note 101, at 1674-75.
142. See Melamed & Petit, supra note 119, at 750-51, 753.
143. See Lao, supra note 13, at 503 (discussing the business model of advertisement-
supported multisided digital platforms where the consumer-facing side of the platform is free
to users).
144. See Michal S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implications
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the monetary price to consumers is zero, any harm from a dominant
platform’s alleged exclusionary conduct naturally would not be
reflected in prices,145 but rather in loss of quality or innovation.146
Correctly applied, as earlier discussed, the consumer welfare
standard should capture consumers’ competition-related harms
other than price.147 However, loss of quality or reduced innovation
claims, never easy to establish in any case, are all the more difficult
against the largest digital technology companies because of their
track record of fast-paced innovation, quality improvements, and
substantial investments in research and development.148 Proving
what might have been is always difficult, but it is particularly hard
in industries where the incumbents are generally celebrated for
their frequent rollout of new and improved products or features,149
for Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523, 548-49 (2015) (analyzing the difficulty
of showing consumer harm in two-sided platform markets where the consumer-facing side of
the market is nominally free). Although consumers do not pay a monetary price for use of
these platforms, they are not truly free. Consumers “pay” with their attention and their
personal data. In theory, it should be possible to assign a monetary value to what consumers
“give” for the use of Facebook or the Google search engine, for example, and to evaluate
whether any alleged bad act results in consumers having to “give” more for the same use of
the platform. As a practical matter, conducting such an analysis would be very challenging.
145. See Shelanski, supra note 101, at 1667 (“[T]he usual price-oriented antitrust analysis
may be irrelevant in markets where many consumers pay nothing for the services they use
and in which firms compete more through technological advancements than through lower
prices.”). It should be noted that the advertising side of these two-sided platforms does pay,
but prices have been declining substantially—suggesting that this market is competitive—and
no allegations of adverse price effects on the advertising side have been made. See Ip, supra
note 9 (noting that the price advertisers pay Google per click has fallen by a third the past
three years).
146. Grunes & Stucke, supra note 131, at 4-5, 8 (arguing that with less competition, the
large platforms have less incentive to innovate or to improve the quality of their offerings,
leading to a possible degradation of quality).
147. But see Vaheesan, supra note 25, at 983 (contending that the consumer welfare
antitrust standard has led to courts “rewrit[ing] doctrine not to protect consumers, but to
preserve the freedom of dominant and other powerful corporations”).
148. See Petit, supra note 96, at 21-24 (providing R&D investment data for Google,
Microsoft, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon); Rani Molla, Amazon Spent Nearly $23 Billion on
R&D Last Year—More Than Any Other U.S. Company, RECODE (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.
vox.com/2018/4/9/17204004/amazon-research-development-rd [https://perma.cc/RN7Y-S9S5]
(reporting that Amazon, Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Microsoft, Apple, and Facebook
were top-ranked for R&D spending among U.S. companies).
149. Consumers are almost conditioned now to expect something new or improved on the
most popular platforms on a regular basis. Not that long ago, for example, we marveled at the
ability to get directions on map applications on smartphones. Now, we cease to be amazed
even when Google introduces features allowing us to download maps in advance for offline
2020] NO-FAULT DIGITAL PLATFORM MONOPOLIZATION 785
overall superior service,150 and huge R&D investments.151 How does
one demonstrate, or even credibly claim, that had Google, Facebook,
Amazon, or Apple, for example, faced more competition, they would
have introduced more innovative products or features?
Yet concerns about the absence of meaningful competition in the
major platform markets, and its potential implications in the long
run, are legitimate and deserve more attention. Without competi-
tion, any firm’s incentives to innovate or expand would naturally be
reduced,152 and there would also be no real constraints on the plat-
forms’ abilities to exploit their power. Moreover, it is reasonable to
surmise that the presence of a super-dominant incumbent such as
Google or Facebook in a market, and fear of its strategic conduct,
would chill innovation and venture capital investment in any
nascent competitor’s start-up projects. And, if Facebook or Google
can freely copy the features of a start-up’s product proven to be a hit
with users (that are not subject to intellectual property protection),
in addition to fairness issues, one would intuitively expect less
incentive to innovate on the part of start-ups and less investor
willingness to invest in start-up projects.153 This intuition has found
some support in recent empirical research showing that Android
apps exhibit less innovation when Google vertically integrates into
their markets.154 Section 2 seems ill-equipped to deal with these
types of problems involving the large digital platform companies,
use, which is particularly useful for international travel. See Devon Delfino, How to Download
Maps on the Google Maps App for Offline Use When You're Traveling or Don't Have Good
Service, BUS. INSIDER (May, 9, 2019, 9:25 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ how-to-use-
google-maps-offline [https://perma.cc/M6G2-7A92].
150. See, e.g., Karen Weise, Last-Minute Shoppers Increasingly Trust Only Amazon to
Deliver, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/technology/amazon-
last-minute-gifts-shopping.html [https://perma.cc/69SG-6MDV]. Even Lina Khan, the face of
New Brandeis and probably Amazon’s harshest critic, acknowledges the popularity of the
company with consumers and its contributions to e-commerce. Khan, supra note 9, at 714.
151. See Petit, supra note 96, at 21-24.
152. See Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH. CTR. FOR
EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 20, 2017), https://equitablegrowth.org/market-power-in-the-u-s-
economy-today/ [https://perma.cc/9MZ2-VYCE].
153. See Dwoskin, supra note 10 (arguing that Facebook’s copying of start-up competitors’
product features “is having a profound impact on innovation in Silicon Valley, by creating a
strong disincentive for investors and start-ups to put money and effort into creating products
Facebook might copy”).
154. Wen Wen & Feng Zhu, Threat of Platform-Owner Entry and Complementor Responses:
Evidence from the Mobile App Market, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1336, 1349-51 (2019).
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leaving us with unanswerable questions of which innovations con-
sumers may miss because nascent firms are unable to get funding
or are unwilling to take risks given the largest platforms’ outsized
dominance, or which quality improvements may not take place
because of the lack of competition.
2. The Failure of Antitrust, Including Section 2, to Address
Social and Political, and Other Noncompetition Harms155
The New Brandeis critiques, however, go beyond arguments that,
as applied, the consumer welfare standard fails to capture all
competition-related consumer harms. They further challenge the
limited competition-related economic objectives of antitrust and
argue for a more expansive vision.156 In this view, even aggressive
antitrust enforcement under existing law is inadequate because
current doctrine fails to take into account the full panoply of social
or political harms that might be associated with concentrated
economic power.157
Among the critiques is that excessive market power is unfair to
smaller market participants158 and contributes to economic inequal-
ity.159 Furthermore, economic power tends to yield political power,160
155. My purpose here is to briefly set forth the gist of the New Brandeis arguments that
bigness undermines our democracy and is a source of many of our social and political
problems and is not an attempt to discuss these issues in detail.
156. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 237; Vaheesan, supra note 25, at 981; see also
sources cited supra note 122. Some antitrust progressives not necessarily identified with the
New Brandeis movement also share this perspective. See Harry First & Spencer Weber
Waller, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2544-46 (2013) (arguing
generally that antitrust technocrats have sidetracked antitrust’s broader mission of
preventing concentrations of economic and political power); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering
Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 556-57, 595-602, 611-13 (2012).
157. See, e.g., Vaheesan, supra note 25, at 984 (“Powerful businesses are using their might
to hurt Americans in myriad ways, and consumer welfare captures at most only a subset of
these public harms.”). This view is reflected as well in the Consolidation Prevention and
Competition Promotion Act of 2017, introduced by Senator Amy Klobuchar. S. 1812, 115th
Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2017) (“[U]ndue market concentration also contributes to the consolidation
of political power, undermining the health of democracy in the United States.”).
158. See S. 1812 § 2(a); see also Khan, supra note 9, at 741-42.
159. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 238-45. The association between excessive
market power and economic inequality was actually made earlier by non-New Brandeis
antitrust economists, Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop. See Baker & Salop, supra note 6, at
11-13.
160. See Khan, Ideological Roots, supra note 25, at 961 (“Dominant firms’ economic power
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and political power on the part of large corporations tends to
undermine American democracy.161
These concerns are magnified with respect to the largest digital
platforms because they control a significant share of our commerce
and communications, and impact many aspects of our lives.162
Google’s dominance in search, for example, gives it an outsized
influence in shaping our virtual environment.163 It determines,
through its artificial intelligence-based algorithms, the digital
advertisements that we see and the search results that are dis-
played in response to our search queries. This suggests that the
inevitable biases of Google’s systems and employees who write the
algorithms could influence the information and content that flows
to all of us.164 The New Brandeisians correctly point out that the
consumer welfare standard is incapable of factoring these risks into
antitrust analysis.165
As for Facebook, a slew of scandals has recently embroiled the
social network. They include the company’s mishandling of users’
personal data, its role in the Cambridge Analytica incident and in
a number of security breaches, and its negligence in allowing
Russian meddling and “fake news” to spread during the 2016 U.S.
presidential election.166 The problem is that although these serious
allows them ... to concentrate political power.”).
161. See Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 236, 265-67. Some political economists and
antitrust progressives not considered part of the New Brandeis group share this concern. See
Baker & Salop, supra note 6, at 6-8 (“The wealthiest have a disproportionate influence on
public policy.... This political effect can make inequality self-reinforcing: the economic power
of those at the top gives the wealthy political power, which can be used to entrench and
enhance their economic power, further increase their political power, and so on. This vicious
cycle creates the possibility that inequality could threaten our democracy.”); Pitofsky, supra
note 82, at 1051 (arguing that an economy “dominated by a few corporate giants” would “breed
antidemocratic political pressures”).
162. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access,
Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1173-76, 1174
n.137, 1175 n.140, 1176 n.146 (2008) (arguing that Google’s dominance as a search engine
allows it to act as a gatekeeper to the Internet).
163. See Farhad Manjoo, Here’s the Conversation We Really Need to Have About Bias at
Google, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/technology/bias-
google-trump.html [https://perma.cc/NER5-DRQK].
164. Id.
165. See sources cited supra notes 120-23, 157.
166. See Aric Jenkins, We’re Keeping Track of All of Facebook’s Scandals So You Don’t Have
To, FORTUNE (Apr. 6, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/04/06/facebook-scandals-mark-zucker-
berg/ [https://perma.cc/B686-QS5A].
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transgressions did harm consumers, they were largely not antitrust
transgressions that Facebook committed in order to protect or
enhance its monopoly power. However, probably because laws more
specifically targeted to the noncompetition-related misconduct and
related problems are nonexistent and woefully inadequate,167 some
have looked to antitrust for a solution and have found it wanting.
Noting, correctly, that even strong antitrust enforcement under
the traditional monopolization paradigm will not adequately
address some of the problems just discussed, New Brandeis
commentators have made various suggestions for reform, including
a no-fault approach to monopolization.168 Under Lina Khan and
Sandeep Vaheesan’s proposal, no “bad act” would be necessary to
find section 2 liability if a firm possesses monopoly power for an
extended period of time, such as five years.169 Another New Brandeis
commentator implicitly endorsed no-fault monopolization by argu-
ing that the conduct requirement of section 2 is “bias[ed] in favor of
monopolies” and amounts to a “per se rule in favor of monopoliza-
tion.”170 Senator Elizabeth Warren’s recent policy proposal to break
up Amazon, Google, Facebook, and Apple—technology firms that
have annual global revenue of $25 billion or more and additionally
operate a platform or digital marketplace—likewise represents a no-
fault approach.171
In addition to no-fault, other New Brandeis suggestions include
replacing the consumer welfare lodestone with various other tests
or standards, including a “citizen interest” test172 and a standard
167. For example, it is generally well known that today’s information-based companies tend
to employ far fewer workers relative to companies of comparable size in “traditional”
industries, due to automation and technological advances. Yet, job retraining or educational
initiatives designed to prepare workers for employment in the new economy have not been
embraced. As another example, despite consumers’ growing concerns about privacy and the
security of their data, there are no comprehensive federal privacy or data security laws in the
United States. Nor is there systematic regulation over how networks, such as Facebook, must
police “fake news” and other false content. See infra Part III.B for further discussion.
168. See The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of
Doubt?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition and Consumer Rights of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 4-5 (2017) (statement of Diana Moss, President,
American Antitrust Institute) (summarizing, though disagreeing with, the variety of views
and proposals of the antitrust populists, such as New Brandeisians).
169. Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 285-87.
170. Woodcock, supra note 25, at 116.
171. See Warren, supra note 18.
172. Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 275-76.
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that focuses on “our interests as workers, producers, entrepreneurs,
and citizens.”173 Others have proposed the regulation of the largest
digital platforms as public utilities or natural monopolies as a
solution.174 My discussion here of the New Brandeis proposals will
be confined to the no-fault theory.
III. NO-FAULT REFORM EFFORTS WOULD BE MISPLACED
As earlier discussed, the sheer dominance of the largest platforms
in their respective spheres likely carries a risk of harm to innova-
tion in the long run. Moreover, even granted that the largest tech
platforms have delivered impressive consumer benefits so far, it is
not off base to suspect that the benefits could be larger still if they
faced more meaningful competition.175 Thus, from an economic
perspective alone, the evidence supports reducing concentration and
encouraging competition. The more difficult question is whether no-
fault monopolization is a desirable or feasible approach to the
problem. I conclude that it is not, at least not at this time, though
stronger section 2 enforcement is long overdue.
A. Erosion of the Economic Foundation Underlying No-Fault
Theory of Section 2 Liability
Despite the initial support from many prominent antitrust
intellectuals, in a time that was much more congenial to small
businesses than today,176 earlier attempts to pass no-fault monopoli-
zation legislation and other deconcentration initiatives nevertheless
all failed.177 This suggests that even when the conditions for success
were most favorable, policymakers and others still had misgivings
about finding section 2 liability absent exclusionary conduct. Now,
173. Khan, supra note 9, at 737.
174. See id. at 797-800; see also Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 162, at 1206-09 (advocating
intensive regulation of Internet search platforms through new federal agencies, such as a
Federal Search Commission).
175. See Baker, supra note 152 (“These platforms have delivered substantial consumer
benefits.... Yet consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole would likely benefit even more if
they faced greater competition.”).
176. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
177. See First, supra note 19, at 58-59 (describing the no-fault movement between 1969-
1979); Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1126-27, 1136-37.
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with modern antitrust economic scholarship having raised serious
questions about the SCP model that was dominant from the 1940s
through the 1970s,178 more reservations are inevitable, and war-
ranted.
Notably, the no-fault movement had drawn its intellectual
strength from the SCP body of economic scholarship.179 Given the
SCP premise that persistent market power is likely associated with
anticompetitive conduct and inefficiencies, combatting monopolies
directly and seeking to restructure those firms, without identifying
bad conduct, seemed efficient.180 It would promise much benefit
without the risk of much loss.
The growth and ascendance in the 1980s of a new body of
economic scholarship that severely challenged the SCP assump-
tions, however, weakened the economic foundation of the no-fault
theories and earlier policy proposals. And it eventually led many
who had initially endorsed various no-fault initiatives to retract
their support.181
Thus, if the idea of a no-fault theory of section 2 liability is
economically motivated, it would be more prudent to have some
concrete cost-benefit studies to evaluate whether it is likely to be
beneficial on balance, rather than to rely on rough judgments. On
the one hand, no-fault intervention would very likely inflict some
economic welfare losses since, at the very least, it would reduce the
benefits generated by the substantial economies of scale and
network effects of the large technology platforms lost as a result of
intervention. On the other hand, it could increase economic welfare
by introducing competition into the dominant firm’s market and
complementary markets because competition typically benefits
consumers. But whether the net welfare effect is beneficial requires
some solid research. From an economic perspective at least, it seems
safer to have some hard evidence that the economic benefits of
178. See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18, 33-34 (1968) (showing that substantial economies of scale
often exist in many markets, and that market power is often based on superior performance);
see also Orbach & Rebling, supra note 120, at 638 & nn.190-91 (citing to more theoretical and
empirical literature that undermined the SCP paradigm). Note that Williamson was initially
a no-fault supporter. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
181. See Brozen, supra note 63, at 826-30, 828 n.8.
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dispersing the platforms’ substantial market power, absent exclu-
sionary conduct, outweigh the losses before we entertain the idea of
restructuring or otherwise disrupting some of the country’s most
successful companies.
B. Other More Appropriate and Less Risky Instruments for
Addressing Social and Political Ills
Of course, the primary motivation for the no-fault proposals may
be noneconomic. Some critics have linked the immense economic
power of the largest technology platforms to a variety of social and
political ills, including rising economic inequality, the insufficient
creation of good jobs, the dearth of opportunities for small busi-
nesses, political corruption, privacy intrusions, the problem of “fake
news,” and interference with our elections which threaten our
democracy.182 Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop have argued
persuasively that stronger and wiser antitrust enforcement can help
reduce economic inequality by reducing monopoly profits, since
monopoly profits represent a transfer of consumer wealth from
consumers to the monopoly’s shareholders and senior executives,
who generally tend to be more affluent than average consumers.183
But, beyond that, antitrust law is not primarily a wealth and income
distribution tool. Nor is it tailored specifically to create good jobs, or
to address other social and political issues.
182. See WU, supra note 2, at 21 (arguing that the problems we face from the large tech
platforms go beyond the “narrowly economic”); Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 6, at 238-45,
265-67 (asserting that excessive market power contributes to economic inequality, which leads
to political inequality, undermining American democracy); Ip, supra note 9 (stating that,
according to critics, the large technology giants’ “alleged sins run the gamut from
disseminating fake news and fostering addiction to laying waste to small towns’ shopping
districts”); Neil Irwin, Are Superstar Firms and Amazon Effects Reshaping the Economy?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/25/upshot/big-corporations-influence-
economy-central-bank.html [https://perma.cc/4LE8-PKFV] (asserting that the dominance of
the “superstar firms” may be depressing wages and slowing economic growth); Steven
Pearlstein, Is Amazon Getting Too Big?, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/business/is-amazon-getting-too-big/2017/07/28/ff38b9ca-722e-11e7-9eac-d56bd5568
db8_story.html [https://perma.cc/JXB4-ELFW] (reciting the many complaints against Amazon
and other technology giants).
183. See Baker & Salop, supra note 6, at 14-20 (suggesting that antitrust agencies make
reducing inequality a priority in its enforcement efforts, which would include prioritizing
cases that benefit the less advantaged over cases where the harms fall mostly on the rich).
792 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:755
I question the advisability of using antitrust law as a primary tool
to try to resolve serious societal problems unrelated, or only
tangentially related, to market competition. While Amazon may be
responsible for the loss of many retail jobs, for example, and the
largest technology firms may employ fewer workers relative to firms
of comparable size in “traditional” industries,184 it is not clear that
no-fault deconcentration is the right way to deal with these
monumental social problems rooted in technological advances. A
more direct approach, using existing or new laws and policies
targeted to the problems at issue, should deliver better results and
have fewer collateral costs. In other words, consumer protection
laws or privacy and data security regulations would be better than
antitrust at dealing with possible transparency, data security, and
consumer deception issues.185 And tax and labor laws, job-training
and education initiatives and so forth would be far better suited
than antitrust to tackle the array of other social and political
problems.186
C. Other Vexing Issues
There are other miscellaneous, but vexing, issues that cut against
a no-fault approach. They include having to answer various complex
questions regarding power and discretion, which makes no-fault far
less effortless than it may seem. Moreover, adopting a no-fault
184. Firms that adopt advanced labor-savings technologies can increase output and
efficiencies while requiring less labor. See David Rotman, How Technology Is Destroying Jobs,
116 MIT TECH. REV., July/Aug. 2013, at 28-33 (arguing automation is eliminating jobs). They
would, therefore, employ fewer employees than comparable firms that are less technologically
based. Id.
185. The European Union, for example, passed the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR), a comprehensive law that gives protection to individuals over their personal data.
EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU Data Protection Rules, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/
justice-and-fundamental-rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules/eu-data-
protection-rules_en [https://perma.cc/G7QP-H9ZS]. See generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al.,
The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is and What It Means, 28
INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 66-67 (2019).
186. See Robert Litan, A Scalpel, Not an Axe: Updating Antitrust and Data Laws to Spur
Competition and Innovation, PROGRESSIVE POL’Y INST., Sept. 2018, at 51-58, https://www.
progressivepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/PPI_AntitrustandDataLaws_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8DZ8-45TY] (suggesting some non-antitrust solutions to tackling privacy,
data security, and “fake news” problems).
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theory of monopolization clearly requires legislative action which
adds yet another hurdle.
1. The Complexity of “Power”: Monopoly Power in a Relevant
Market vs. Absolute Measures of Power (“Bigness”)
If, as it seems, simplicity is what advocates desire, a no-fault
approach will prove disappointing because it raises several complex
conceptual and practical questions with no easy answers. For
example, when should no-fault rules be triggered? Should they
apply only where a firm has persistent monopoly power in a defined
relevant market, as in the 1970s failed proposals?187 Or should the
measure of power, as in Senator Warren’s plan, turn on absolute
values?188
If the former, it is not clear that the approach would do the job
that its proponents seem to want—easily disperse the economic and
political power of the technology giants without protracted litiga-
tion. With so much at stake, if bad conduct and anticompetitive
effects are not required, market definition would become critically
important, and courts probably would be unwilling to find a
violation unless monopoly power is clearly established. However,
establishing monopoly power in a relevant market would be a true
challenge when the products and services of digital platforms tend
to extend across markets and the market delineations are blurry at
best. For example, even for a firm such as Amazon, which undoubt-
edly has immense economic power and reaches into many facets of
American lives, it is difficult to see in which markets (other than
retail book sales) the firm has monopoly power in the antitrust
sense.189 The same is true of Apple. Although Apple famously be-
came the first American firm to reach a market value of $1 trillion
187. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
189. Though Amazon has reached, or is poised to reach, a market value of $1 trillion, its
share of e-commerce retail sales is only about 40 percent (and its sale of all retail sales,
including non e-commerce, is obviously much smaller). See Projected Retail E-Commerce GMV
Share of Amazon in the United States from 2016 to 2021, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/
statistics/788109/amazon-retail-market-share-usa/ [https://perma.cc/RF44-HE9D]; see also
Jeran Wittenstein, Amazon Flirts with $1 Trillion Value Amid 8-Day Rally Streak,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2019, 6:50 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-10/
amazon-back-on-cusp-of-1-trillion-valuation-after-7-day-streak [https://perma.cc/8LAF-JV8L].
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in August 2018,190 it is hard to identify a specific relevant market
where it has monopoly power in an antitrust sense.191
It is true that in a traditional section 2 case, a defendant’s
monopoly power must also be established, and that usually entails
defining the market as well.192 However, courts have been more
willing to dispense with strict market definition and calculations of
market shares, at least in nonmerger cases, where there is actual
evidence of anticompetitive effects.193 But if evidence of conduct and
its effects is not required, as would be the case under no-fault, then
proof of market power would almost necessarily entail defining the
market, at least in some broad sense, and determining market
share.
If the vision of no-fault is for power to turn, not on market power
in a relevant market, but on absolute measures of power—as in
Senator Warren’s plan—that would be a complete break from the
fundamental core of antitrust jurisprudence. It could also be quite
arbitrary in operation, as Senator Warren’s plan itself demon-
strates. Senator Warren’s breakup proposal targets tech companies
with “annual global revenue of $25 billion or more” and that operate
a platform (or digital marketplace).194 She further specifies that it
is intended to apply to Amazon, Facebook, Google, and Apple.195 It
would seem that Microsoft should be included as well, as its annual
190. See Mark Gurman, Apple Becomes First U.S. Company to Hit $1 Trillion Value,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 2, 2018), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-02/apple-be-
comes-first-u-s-company-to-hit-1-trillion-market-value [https://perma.cc/43PL-6ERH].
191. It is common knowledge that the core Apple products and services for which the
company is best known—iPhones, iPads, Mac computers and laptops, and music streaming
(Apple Music)—all face significant competition.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966) (stating that
section 2 of the Sherman Act requires the possession of “monopoly power in the relevant
market”).
193. See, e.g., Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206 (2d Cir. 2001) (“If a plaintiff can show
that a defendant’s conduct exerted an actual adverse effect on competition ... this arguably
is more direct evidence of market power than calculations of elusive market share figures.”).
194. See Warren, supra note 18.
195. Senator Warren’s original announcement of her breakup proposal did not specifically
mention Apple, which meets her criteria for break up; however, she clarified the very next day
that the proposal was intended to cover Apple as well. See Nilay Patel, Elizabeth Warren
Wants to Break Up Apple, Too, VERGE (Mar. 9, 2019, 6:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/3/9/18257965/elizabeth-warren-break-up-apple-monopoly-antitrust [https://perma.cc/
B5UK-Z68L].
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global revenue exceeds $25 billion and it owns a platform, the
Windows app store, but Microsoft is somehow spared.196
The very fact that Warren saw fit to exclude Microsoft from her
breakup proposal, itself, points to a problem with her approach.
Presumably, Warren would exempt Microsoft because she believes
that the company does not pose the harms that warrant a manda-
tory spin-off. But a similarly strong case could be made for exempt-
ing Apple as well. Of the largest digital platforms, Apple has
probably generated the fewest concerns about the risk of exclusion
of potential competitors.197 Moreover, despite the fact that Apple is
famously the first company to reach the $1 trillion mark in market
value, it is not clear how consumers would benefit from a forced
spin-off of its Apple app store.
Another issue related to monopoly power is whether it has to be
persistent, a condition that was incorporated in the 1970s no-fault
proposals198 but not in Senator Warren’s plan. If persistence is
required, what should be its measure—number of years? What if a
firm’s dominance shifts from one market to another market before
the requisite number of years is reached? This could happen in
markets with fast-moving technologies, where a first market be-
comes obsolete or greatly diminished in importance, and a second
market emerges (whose products subsume the key features and
functions of products in the first market).199 In that case, does the
firm’s period of prior dominance in the defunct market transfer over
196. See Warren, supra note 18; see also Satya Nadella, Microsoft Annual Report 2018,
MICROSOFT (2018), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/annualreports/ar2018/annualreport# pri-
maryR2 [https://perma.cc/G4BB-6RB7].
197. See John Koetsier, Why Apple Got Spared as Elizabeth Warren Targets Amazon,
Facebook, Google for Breakup, FORBES (Mar. 8, 2019, 1:12 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
johnkoetsier/2019/03/08/why-apple-got-spared-as-elizabeth-warren-targets-amazon-facebook-
google-for-breakup/ [https://perma.cc/68MZ-5W7C] (arguing Apple is not monopolistic because
its share of markets is so small).
198. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
199. One example of this is the obsolescence of Apple’s iPods, with its iPhones incorpo-
rating the iPod’s features and functions. See Steve Brachmann, iPod, iPhone and iPad—A
Brief History of Apple iProducts, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/
2014/11/25/ipod-iphone-and-ipad-a-brief-history-of-apple-iproducts/id=52243/ [https://perma.
cc/XJ6J-5K6L]. But, in the case of iPods/iPhones, Apple’s dominance in the MP3 (music play-
er) market with its iPod did not carry over to the smartphone market, where Apple’s iPhone
faces substantial competition. See Samuel Gibbs, iPhone Slump: The Rivals Taking a Bite Out
of Apple, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/03/
iphone-slump-the-rivals-taking-a-bite-out-of-apple [https://perma.cc/GRJ3-DFLR].
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to the new market if the firm gains dominance in the second market
as well?
2. The Problem of Discretion
Yet another important question is whether a no-fault liability rule
would (or should) require courts to grant relief once the power
element is satisfied. Or would courts have judicial discretion to
consider the importance or peculiar circumstances of the market
and the welfare costs of any no-fault intervention before making a
determination both on liability and on the remedy? Presumably,
enforcement agencies could exercise prosecutorial discretion as they
usually do, and decline to bring action (despite clear evidence of a
power however it may be defined) if, in their judgment, disrupting
that market would be unwise. The exercise of prosecutorial dis-
cretion is ordinarily desirable, as we want the government to
account for all important factors before making an enforcement
decision. However, with a no-fault regime, discretion essentially
places antitrust agencies in the role of making important judgment
calls on economic regulation, including which industries may be too
critical to our economy to be disrupted, rather than on law enforce-
ment. And it is not clear that antitrust agencies should have that
role.
If power is to be defined by size or some other absolute measure,
the exercise of discretion by antitrust enforcers may be even more
troubling. Again, take the example of Senator Warren’s breakup
plan and her stated intention to have it apply to Amazon, Facebook,
Google, and Apple, but apparently not to Microsoft, although all five
companies fit the plan’s absolute criteria for application.200 Pre-
sumably, Warren did not see major harm in allowing Microsoft to
keep its Windows app store, notwithstanding the company’s large
annual global revenue and its operating a platform/marketplace.
While she may be (and probably is) correct in her assessment, it
highlights a problem with using absolute measures but making ex-
ceptions. How does one decide why Microsoft, but not Apple, should
be exempted, for example? And who should make that determina-
tion?
200. See Warren, supra note 18; see also Nadella, supra note 196.
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3. The Need for Legislation
Finally, from a pragmatic standpoint, adding a no-fault monopoli-
zation cause of action would require legislative action. Passing any
legislation to amend a law that has existed for over 125 years is a
daunting task even if Congress were not as dysfunctional as it is
today. It is an especially difficult mission when the proposed
amendment would depart radically from existing law as a no-fault
amendment would. Given the difficulty involved, the uncertain
results, and the possibility that more harm than good could be done,
it would seem that efforts for stronger and more effective section 2
enforcement would be better (and more safely) spent elsewhere.
IV. REINVIGORATING SECTION 2 THROUGH EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE
AND POLICY
Though a no-fault approach, in my view, would be unwise, this
moment of deep social unease over the economic, social, and political
power of the largest technology companies provides us with a much
needed opportunity to reset the antitrust equilibrium. There is
growing agreement that closer antitrust scrutiny and a generally
tougher line toward today’s largest firms, including those in the
technology sector, is long overdue.201 Not only is there strong evi-
dence of rising industrial concentration and weakening competition,
the economic literature also suggests that competition, more so than
201. See Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform
MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2195 (2018) (recommending revision of legal standards for
platform MFNs); Jonathan B. Baker, Jonathan Sallet & Fiona Scott Morton, Unlocking
Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916, 1917-19 (2018) (discussing ways to strengthen
antitrust enforcement); Lao, supra note 13 (arguing for stronger antitrust enforcement in
data-driven mergers); Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE
L.J. 1962, 1982 (2018) (calling for changes to vertical merger enforcement); Shapiro, supra
note 3, at 737-43 (discussing stricter cartel enforcement, stricter merger enforcement, and
controlling dominant firm conduct as ways to address concerns about rising concentration and
high corporate profits); see also AM. ANTITRUST INST. A NATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY: UN-
PACKING THE PROBLEM OF DECLINING COMPETITION AND SETTING PRIORITIES MOVING FORWARD
8 (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.antitrustinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/AAINatl
CompPolicy-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2Q7-4WCA] (“There is a growing consensus that inade-
quate antitrust policy has contributed to the concentration problem and associated inequality
effects.”).
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monopoly, tends to drive innovation202 and foster economic growth
and prosperity.203 Thus, preventing dominant firms from foreclosing
entry or weakening rivals is important.
Challenging exclusionary conduct is especially important in
today’s high technology markets because such conduct could oust a
nascent threat before the potential rival has had a chance to fully
develop its product and, in so doing, eliminate the possibility of
future innovation.204 Furthermore, because many of the digital
technology markets enjoy network effects and are winner-take-all
markets,205 an incumbent’s market power tends to be durable,
making it all the more imperative to block improper conduct that
forecloses potential entry. My aim below is to highlight a few areas
where efforts could be made to better constrain dominant firm
conduct, particularly on the part of the largest digital companies,
and to move antitrust (perhaps incrementally) in a more interven-
tionist direction.
A. Focus on Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, and Seeking an
Incremental Expansion of the Scope of Exclusionary Conduct 
As discussed earlier, not all conduct that excludes competition is
unlawful under section 2.206 Naturally benefiting from network
and/or lock-in effects, enhanced by an incumbent’s significant data
advantage, for example, is not considered unlawful conduct even if
it contributes substantially to the largest platforms’ entrenched
monopoly power. Nor is excluding rivals through innovation a “bad
act.” However, as even Justice Scalia (known for his solicitude
toward dominant firms) has acknowledged, behavior that might be
202. See Baker, supra note 140, at 583-87 (discussing empirical evidence that supports the
theory that competitive markets, rather than monopolies, are more conducive to innovation).
203. See Baker, supra note 2, at 560 (arguing that antitrust enforcement “supports
economic growth and prosperity by preventing successful incumbent firms and industries from
erecting barriers to the entry of rivals with lower costs, superior production technologies, or
better products”).
204. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that
Microsoft’s conduct foreclosed two nascent threats before they had a chance to either realize
their potential or fail).
205. See Shelanski, supra note 101, at 1682-83.
206. See supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
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permissible—or “might even be viewed as procompetitive—can take
on exclusionary connotations when practiced by a monopolist.”207
Therefore, cognizant of the dominant platforms’ incentives and
abilities to exclude competitors, the agencies could be more vigilant
in scrutinizing the dominant platforms’ practices so as to identify
conduct that may deviate from competition on the merits and that
has the effect of excluding rivals. For instance, while Google’s use of
its large datasets to “train” its algorithms208 to return better search
results is not improper, and the effects beneficial, even if it does
leave rival search engines behind, implementing search algorithms
to disadvantage or discriminate against its competitors in a vertical
or adjacent market would be a different matter. Where the results
are mixed—the algorithmic changes improve search results as well
as injure competitors—given the enormous power of the largest
digital platforms, placing the onus on the dominant platform to
prove that the benefits exceed the harm would be reasonable.
The influential post-Chicago theory of raising rivals’ costs,
developed by Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven Salop, could help
guide these efforts.209 While the largest platforms’ most often
criticized patterns of behavior are not necessarily unlawful under
antitrust doctrine,210 conduct that protects or enhances a dominant
firm’s monopoly power by impeding rivals without benefiting
consumers constitutes raising rivals’ costs and should be recognized
as exclusionary.211 The antitrust agencies could expend more re-
sources examining dominant firm practices and probing allegations
of this nature, which they have occasionally done. One example
involves the FTC’s investigation into Google’s use of proprietary
interfaces that made it more cumbersome for its digital advertisers
207. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 488 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
208. See How Search Algorithms Work, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/search/howsearch
works/algorithms/ [https://perma.cc/5TXV-GW8D].
209. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 212-15 (1986) (pioneering the
influential “raising rivals’ costs” theory on exclusionary conduct).
210. See supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
211. The raising rivals’ costs theory postulates that, under specific conditions, firms can
create or maintain dominance in a market by engaging in strategies that impede rivals by
raising their costs. That can be accomplished through tying arrangements, exclusive dealing,
unilateral refusals to deal, or other practices. Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 209, at 213-
24, 228, 230-49.
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to port their advertisements to additional platforms, without
obvious consumer benefits emanating from the practice.212 Google
retreated from the practice in the face of the FTC investigation,213
illustrating the effectiveness of increased government vigilance.
In light of the importance of personal data in digital platform
markets, another area that might benefit from closer scrutiny
involves investigating and evaluating whether dominant platforms
have constrained their competitors’ ability to compete by impeding
their access to necessary inputs (personal data) or to custom-
ers—such as raising rivals’ costs. While simply enjoying the
inherent advantages of having large datasets and a wide data
advantage is not a “bad act,” burdening rivals by blocking their
access to data critical for success would seem to be classic “raising
rivals’ costs” conduct that could violate section 2.
Another area that might warrant closer attention is where a large
platform also competes directly against some of its platform’s
customers, a situation that Lina Khan, a fierce New Brandeis critic
of Amazon, has found most objectionable.214 Amazon is not only a
dominant online retailer that sells directly to consumers, but it is
additionally a marketing platform that hosts other online retailers
selling to the same pool of Amazon consumer-customers.215 In effect,
Amazon competes against those of its merchant customers who sell
similar products over Amazon’s marketing platform.
This practice or business structure is not necessarily anticompet-
itive, however, and indeed may be procompetitive, since it offers
smaller online retailers without sufficient scale greater exposure to
212. See Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Google Press Conference—Opening
Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chariman Jon Leibowitz (Jan. 3, 2013), https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/opening-remarks-federal-trade-
commission-chairman-jon-leibowitz-prepared-delivery/130103googleleibowitzremarks.pdf
[https://perma.cc/36VG-ADHK] (describing the FTC’s investigation on this issue and Google’s
commitment to drop the restriction that created the difficulty for advertisers to port their
advertisements to additional platforms).
213. See Letter from David Drummond, Chief Legal Officer, Google Inc., to Jon Leibowitz,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
closing_letters/google-inc./130103googleletterchairmanleibowitz.pdf [https://perma.cc/LZ4S-
CZGQ] (agreeing to remove restrictions on the use of AdWords—its advertising platform—
that could make it harder for advertisers to port their advertising across multiple platforms).
214. See Khan, supra note 9, at 774-77.
215. See Start Selling Online: Frequently Asked Questions, AMAZON SERVS., https://services.
amazon.com/selling/faq.html [https://perma.cc/8DR6-SVH5].
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customers than the retailers would otherwise have.216 The practice
also offers those smaller online retailers convenience and presum-
ably lower costs by providing them an option to turn over the
logistics of customer service, shipping, and delivery to Fulfillment-
by-Amazon for a fee.217 However, there are obvious opportunities for
abuse and unfairness. The marketplace setup gives Amazon access
to those merchant customers’ sensitive sales data which it could use
to inform its own business planning and marketing strategies, to the
competitive disadvantage of its merchant rivals.218
My point here is not that the structure—a dominant online
retailer also operating an online platform that hosts (some)
competing retailers—is inherently anticompetitive, and should be
disallowed as Senator Warren has proposed.219 Rather, the point is
that, cognizant of the importance of data and the risks to competi-
tion this structure poses, the antitrust agencies should develop
expertise in digital markets and be vigilant in scrutinizing the
platforms’ practices to identify and prevent those that might thwart
competition on the merits from the platform company’s competitors
on the platform.
Yet another related area worth exploring would be a dominant
platform’s discriminatory refusal to deal with a customer because of
the customer’s competition against the platform in another market.
For example, last year Facebook allegedly denied its potential rivals
access to its troves of user data while granting access to other
nonrival customers.220 To the extent that these claims are credible,
antitrust enforcers should be willing to investigate and bring action,
in an attempt to push out the boundaries of unilateral refusals to
216. While a small online retail store may have its own website, it is obviously able to reach
a much larger pool of potential customers being on Amazon’s marketplace platform, given
Amazon’s large customer base.
217. Since Fulfillment-by-Amazon is a voluntary service, it is logical that the online
merchants who choose to subscribe to it must find the service more convenient and cost
effective relative to their assuming these services for their own customers independently. See
Fulfillment by Amazon, AMAZON SERVS., https://services.amazon.com/fulfillment-by-amazon/
benefits.html [https://perma.cc/QM37-FDW9]; see also Khan, supra note 9, at 776-77.
218. See Khan, supra note 9, at 776-77.
219. See Warren, supra note 18.
220. See Adam Satariano & Mike Isaac, Facebook Used People’s Data to Favor Certain
Partners and Punish Rivals, Documents Show, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/12/05/technology/facebook-documents-uk-parliament.html [https://perma.cc/
HT4B-F892].
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deal that were set in Trinko. While the Supreme Court seemed to
have limited the viability of refusal to deal claims to instances
where the dominant firm had a prior course of dealing with the
plaintiff,221 the fact that Trinko did not involve a selective refusal to
deal with competitors could be a distinguishing factor.222 And that
may support an argument that courts could stretch Trinko to reach
discriminatory refusals to deal similar to the claim made against
Facebook.
In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., a 1986 case
which has never been overruled, the Supreme Court condemned
dominant firm conduct as exclusionary when it extends or en-
trenches the firm’s market power “on some basis other than
efficiency.”223 Aspen elaborated further that exclusionary conduct is
“behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of ri-
vals, but also (2) either does not further competition on the merits
or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way.”224 This language en-
visions a broader scope for impermissible conduct under section 2
than is generally assumed today and could support the bringing of
a broader range of cases.
In short, closer scrutiny of the largest technology companies’
practices to identify suspect conduct, and a greater willingness to
rely on more liberal (less “safe”) theories of harm, such as raising
rivals’ costs, could ultimately move us toward a stronger section 2
policy. Likewise, a willingness to bring test cases in appropriate
circumstances, with an eye toward persuading courts to expand the
scope of exclusionary conduct, would be helpful as well.
221. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004) (“The refusal to deal alleged in the present case does not fit within the limited
exception recognized in Aspen Skiing. The complaint does not allege that Verizon voluntarily
engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals” that it terminated).
222. In a pre-Trinko Seventh Circuit opinion on dominant firm refusal to deal, Judge
Posner suggested that an “essential feature” of a unilateral refusal to deal case is “a monopoly
supplier’s discriminating against a customer because the customer has decided to compete
with it.” Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 377 (7th Cir. 1986).
A good argument can be made that this case survives Trinko.
223. 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985).
224. Id. at 605 n.32.
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B. Greater Flexibility in the Analysis of Effects
Another way to achieve stronger section 2 enforcement is to move
toward greater flexibility in the analysis of anticompetitive effects.
As discussed earlier, a primary New Brandeis charge against
today’s monopolization doctrine is that the consumer welfare
standard supposedly prohibits only conduct that results in short-
term higher prices or reduced output.225 While this claim is factually
incorrect,226 successful challenges based on pure nonprice harms are
indeed rare.227 This is, however, due to practical problems of proof
and not to any legal deficiencies of the standard, as United States v.
Microsoft Corp. demonstrates.
One way to remedy this practical problem of proof is to draw
inspiration from Microsoft and allow for more flexibility in the
analysis of effects. This could include a greater willingness to (1)
infer consumer harm from harm to the competitive process, (2) give
more credence to claims of long run, if somewhat uncertain, harm
to innovation, and (3) accord legitimacy and more weight to
qualitative evidence, including intent evidence. Alternatively, or
additionally, courts could apply rebuttable presumptions of anti-
225. See Khan, supra note 9, at 710 (“[T]he current framework in antitrust—specifically
its pegging competition to ‘consumer welfare,’ defined as short-term price effects—is
unequipped to capture the architecture of market power in the modern economy.”); Tim Wu,
After Consumer Welfare, Now What? The “Protection of Competition” Standard in Practice,
CPI ANTITRUST CHRON., Spring 2018, at 12, 15 (criticizing the “price fixation” of the consumer
welfare standard).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (incor-
porating considerations of nonprice economic harms); see also Michael L. Katz & Howard A.
Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (discussing policymakers’
concern with fostering innovation in merger enforcement since the 1980s).
227. The FTC has challenged at least one proposed merger, between Thoratec and
HeartWare, based solely on innovation effects. See In re Thoratec Corp. & HeartWare Int’l,
Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. 9339, at 1 (July 28, 2009) (Complaint), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/cases/2009/07/090730thorateadminccmpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/96C4-
4U9R]. Thoratec had a product for patients who suffer from end-stage heart failure, and
HeartWare was a potential entrant which had a product in the FDA approval process. Id.
There were no other firms working to develop a similar competitive product. Id. The FTC’s
concern was that Thoratec would have less incentive, postmerger, to work toward bringing
the HeartWare product to market. See id. The parties abandoned the merger after the FTC
issued the complaint. See Justine Varieur Cadet, Thoratec Abandons $282M Purchase of
HeartWare After FTC Block, HEALTHIMAGING (Aug. 3, 2009), http://www.healthimaging.com/
topics/diagnostic-imaging/thoratec-abandons-282m-purchase-heartware-after-ftc-block
[https://perma.cc/89DK-QCXY].
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competitive effects under certain conditions, which would consider-
ably reduce the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
1. Drawing Inference of Consumer Harm from Evidence of
Harm to the Competitive Process
The consumer effects of dominant firm conduct that have
excluded or weakened smaller rivals often are not readily apparent,
and demanding actual proof of consumer harm will likely result in
underenforcement. In contrast, demonstrating that a dominant firm
has undermined the competitive process, such as by competing on
some basis other than efficiency,228 is typically easier. Allowing an
inference of consumer harm to be drawn from evidence of harm to
the competitive process would, therefore, lessen the burden on a
section 2 plaintiff in establishing liability. In fact, the D.C. Circuit
seems to have employed this approach in Microsoft.
In United States v. Microsoft Corp., Microsoft, which had a
monopoly in the relevant operating systems (OS) market through
Windows, perceived a threat to Windows from two new non-OS
products—Netscape’s browser and Sun’s Java programming lan-
guage.229 The Netscape browser and Java, if successfully developed
to their full capability, could provide a new way for applications
software to access a computer’s OS, which could then weaken
Windows’s monopoly in the OS market because consumers would no
longer be deterred from switching to another OS due to the dearth
of applications software developed for the competing OS.230
The Government charged that, to protect its Windows monopoly,
Microsoft engaged in a variety of exclusionary practices to squash
Netscape’s browser and Java before they could potentially succeed
in developing the features that could threaten Microsoft’s Windows
monopoly.231 There was no evidence, however, that Microsoft’s bad
conduct raised prices either for Windows or for browsers (which
228. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605 (treating acts that extend or entrench a dominant firm’s
market power “on some basis other than efficiency” as exclusionary conduct).
229. 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 28 (D.D.C. 1999).
230. Id.; see Marina Lao, Reclaiming a Role for Intent Evidence in Monopolization Analysis,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 185-86 (2004) (discussing Microsoft’s concerns regarding the threat to
its OS monopoly from middleware platforms).
231. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58; Lao, supra note 230, at 185-86 (summarizing the acts
Microsoft took to foreclose Netscape’s browser and Java).
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were free to consumers).232 Nor was there evidence that, but for
Microsoft’s conduct, Netscape or Java would have succeeded in
developing the features that could have transformed those products
into viable threats to Windows.233 The Court of Appeals, neverthe-
less, affirmed section 2 liability against Microsoft.234
In speaking of the need to show “anticompetitive effect[s]” to
establish a prima facie section 2 case, the court said that the
conduct must “harm the competitive process and thereby harm
consumers.”235 As there was little tangible evidence of harm to
consumers—only the undermining of competition on the merits—the
court was effectively drawing an inference of consumer harm from
evidence of harm to the competitive process. Along the same lines,
in addressing the issue of bad conduct and causation, given that
Microsoft’s actions crushed the nascent threats from Netscape and
Java before either company could prove an ability to erode the
Windows monopoly, the court said that “it would be inimical to the
purpose of the Sherman Act to allow monopolists free rein to squash
nascent, albeit unproven, competitors at will—particularly in
industries marked by rapid technological advance and frequent
paradigm shifts.”236 In other words, the court found it unnecessary
for the Government to prove the eventual viability of the nascent
technologies (thus, harm to consumers) had they not been van-
quished early on by Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct.
To the extent that inferring consumer harm from harm to the
competitive process, subject to rebuttal by the dominant firm,237
becomes more routinely accepted, the task of proving unlawful
monopolization could be eased. Conduct that harms the competitive
process is often not that difficult to observe, and demonstrating
disruption of the competition process is easier than identifying
232. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59.
233. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 44 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that
“the evidence does not prove that [Netscape’s browser and Java] would have succeeded absent
Microsoft’s actions”); Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (finding that the “middleware
technologies [Netscape’s browser and Java] have a long way to go before they might imperil
the applications barrier to entry”).
234. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 46.
235. Id. at 58.
236. Id. at 79.
237. The dominant firm should be given the opportunity to defeat the inference by proving
that consumers benefited from the practice and that the benefit is likely to be long-lasting and
substantial, and would outweigh the actual and potential foreclosure effect.
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direct harm to consumers. Additionally, this approach is reasonable
from an economic perspective because it is reasonable to assume
that harm to the competitive process would likely harm consumers
in the long run even if direct consumer effects are not immediately
apparent. Start-ups, or smaller rivals and potential rivals to
dominant firms, would be discouraged from innovating and other-
wise competing if dominant firms were able to “compete” through a
subversion of the competitive process rather than on the merits.
2. Elevating and Promoting the Theory of Long-Run
Innovation Harms, and Creating Presumptions
Antitrust has long recognized that firms in high technology
markets often compete more on innovation than on price;238
consequently, protecting innovation should be a paramount
objective. The economic scholarship, moreover, suggests that
competition fosters innovation, and overall economic growth and
prosperity;239 thus, the likely effect of suppressing competition
would be reduced innovation and economic growth. It follows, then,
that antitrust analysis should give substantial weight to the effect
of any alleged exclusionary conduct on innovation, with the aim of
prohibiting such conduct and encouraging innovation.
Exclusionary conduct in high technology markets carries a
particularly high risk of harm to innovation because, as in Micro-
soft, it often means driving out a nascent technology or innovation
in the early stages of development,240 depriving it of the opportunity
to develop to its full potential without hindrance. Yet, applying a
conventional measure of harm would likely result in the finding of
no consumer harm, precisely because the nascent product was
unproven when it was quashed by the dominant firm’s bad conduct.
Obviously, whether a particular upstart constituted a reasonable
238. See Shelanski, supra note 101, at 1684-85 (discussing the centrality of innovation to
digital platform markets).
239. For a survey of the extensive economic literature relating to competition and
innovation, see generally Richard Gilbert, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where Are We in the
Competition-Innovation Debate?, in 6 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 159 (Adam B.
Jaffe et al. eds., 2006).
240. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 30 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding that
the “middleware technologies have a long way to go before they might imperil the applications
barrier to entry”).
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nascent threat or whether the threat was too tentative or remote to
support that finding is a question of fact, in a specific case.
Nevertheless, antitrust agencies could and should be more
aggressive in putting forward innovation effects as the theory of
harm when a nascent rival is crushed, even if there is a fair amount
of uncertainty as to the viability of the threat. Resolving doubts
about innovation effects in favor of promoting entry is justified,
given the importance of innovation to high technology markets,
because suppressing competition would likely chill innovation from
rivals and potential rivals. Equally important, requiring proof of a
high likelihood that a dominant firm’s bad conduct against a
nascent threat caused anticompetitive harm could have the perverse
result of “encourag[ing] monopolists to take more and earlier
anticompetitive action” against a nascent competitor.241 Also, as the
court of appeals noted in Microsoft, it is only right that “the
defendant is made to suffer the uncertain consequences of its own
undesirable conduct.”242
Easing proof of harm to innovation could take the form of
adjusting burdens of proof and adopting the use of presumptions.
Antitrust courts today tend to be far more concerned about the risks
of false positives than false negatives, largely because of the belief
that the former is more costly than the latter.243 Mistakenly
condemning procompetitive conduct, it is thought, would chill
innovation and have lasting adverse effects whereas mistakenly
overlooking anticompetitive conduct should have fleeting impact
because markets tend to self-correct.244 Recent commentary has
already cast considerable doubt on these conservative error-cost
241. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 79.
242. Id. (quoting 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 78 (4th ed.
2013)).
243. See Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s Wrong
with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 37 (2015) (criticizing conservative antitrust
“assumptions [that] systematically overstate the incidence and significance of false positives,
understate the incidence and significance of false negatives, and understate the net benefits
of various rules by overstating their costs”).
244. See Easterbrook, supra note 21, at 2-4 (making the argument that false positives are
more costly than false negatives in antitrust cases because false positives will deter
procompetitive conduct, and the efficiencies of the conduct falsely condemned will be lost
forever, whereas the adverse effects of false negatives are less consequential because they will
dissipate quickly as the market self-corrects).
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assumptions,245 and in the context of digital platform markets, the
assumptions are even more suspect. Digital platform markets have
substantial network effects, which render them less susceptible to
market self-correction. Thus, the assumption that markets quickly
self-correct, thereby minimizing the effects of false negatives, is
highly questionable in these markets.
This suggests that some recalibration of the rules to acknowledge
the risks and high costs of false negatives, and to reduce the over-
stated fears of false positives, is overdue. The adjustment could sim-
ply take the form of adopting presumptions and burden-shifting.
One of the drawbacks of the current heavily fact-intensive approach
to proving effects is that while it may minimize false positives, the
risk of false negatives is necessarily higher if the plaintiff bears the
full burden of proof on factors that are inherently difficult to prove.
Using presumptions and a burden-shifting framework would light-
en that burden.
Conceptually, this suggestion would call for a presumption of
anticompetitive effect to attach if the plaintiff demonstrates that a
firm with monopoly power engaged in conduct that is outside the
norm of what is considered competition on the merits, and the
conduct foreclosed actual or nascent rivals in the relevant market
or in a vertical/adjacent market. The defendant would have the
opportunity to rebut the presumption by offering a nonpretextual
business justification and showing that the procompetitive benefits
exceed the anticompetitive harms. This framework would be slightly
more pro-plaintiff than that applied in Microsoft where the plaintiff
has to first demonstrate the anticompetitive effect of the conduct,246
after which the burden shifts to the defendant only to proffer a
nonpretextual business justification.247 If the defendant is able to do
so, under the Microsoft framework, the burden shifts back to the
245. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 243.
246. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 58-59 (“[T]he plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof of course
rests, ... must demonstrate that the monopolist’s conduct indeed has the requisite
anticompetitive effect” to establish a prima facie case).
247. Id. at 59. (“[I]f a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case under § 2 by
demonstrating anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a ‘procompetitive
justification’ for its conduct. If the monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification—a
nonpretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it
involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal—then the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim.” (internal citations omitted)).
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plaintiff to either rebut the justification or to demonstrate that the
anticompetitive harms exceed the procompetitive benefits.248
C. Respecting Qualitative Evidence
“Modern” antitrust’s anxiety over false positives (while being
curiously sanguine about false negatives) has led to a strong bias in
favor of quantitative, as opposed to qualitative, evidence. While
quantitative evidence is undoubtedly desirable if it exists, skepti-
cism about the legitimacy and value of qualitative evidence is
damaging to antitrust enforcement because, quite simply, quantita-
tive evidence of some important consumer harms is typically
nonexistent or difficult to compile.
Affording greater respect for qualitative evidence could signifi-
cantly ease the plaintiff ’s burden of proving harms that are largely
unquantifiable. This is especially important in markets where
companies compete more on innovation and quality than on price
because any alleged reductions in quality and innovation resulting
from a dominant firm’s bad conduct are unlikely to be reflected in
quantitative data. Giving a role to qualitative evidence as suggested
here, in fact, is not a novel idea. Faced with the reality that
empirical data is sometimes unavailable or too difficult to compile,
agencies have relied on, and courts have accepted, qualitative
evidence in different settings, such as in the definition of a relevant
antitrust market.249
For instance, while courts may speak in economic terms of having
to determine the “cross-elasticity of demand” to define a relevant
market,250 the data necessary to empirically estimate demand elas-
ticities—including cost information for multiple products—may be
unavailable. In that case, agencies have offered, and courts have ac-
cepted, qualitative evidence indicating which products consumers
view as acceptable alternatives to the product in question in order
248. Id. (“[I]f the monopolist’s procompetitive justification stands unrebutted, then the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the
procompetitive benefit.”).
249. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 129, 132-33 (2007).
250. See United States v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394, 400 (1956).
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to define the market, in place of empirical evidence of demand
elasticities.251
Consider, too, the precise technical rules for market definition set
forth in the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Joint Horizontal Merger Guidelines—the hypothetical monop-
olist SSNIP (small but significant nontransitory increase in price)
test.252 The SSNIP test is designed to determine whether alterna-
tive products are sufficiently acceptable from the buyer’s perspective
to serve as a competitive constraint on the seller of the product(s) in
the candidate market.253 It does so by asking whether a hypothetical
monopolist of the product in question can profitably raise prices by
a small but significant amount and hold the price increase for a non-
transitory period254 (typically 5 percent for one year).255 If a SSNIP
can be implemented, the market is deemed properly defined.256 If a
SSNIP cannot be implemented because too many sales would be lost
to substitute products, rendering the hypothetical SSNIP unprofit-
able, the market definition would be expanded to include those
reasonable substitutes, and the test would be repeated iteratively
with the expanded group of products until a SSNIP can be imple-
mented, at which point the market is properly defined.257
The hypothetical monopolist SSNIP test is a precise economic
tool, but, in practice, the quantitative evidence needed to
operationalize it is sometimes not readily available, in which case
qualitative evidence is offered, in addition to or instead of quantita-
tive evidence.258 The qualitative evidence could include, for example,
anecdotal evidence, market executives’ testimony as to how buyers
responded after a previous price increase, informal buyer surveys,
evidence relating to industry participants’ behavior, the views of
industry experts as to which products they see as likely substitutes
251. See, e.g., id. at 394, 400, 402-03.
252. See generally U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER




255. Id. § 4.1.2.
256. See id. § 4.1.1.
257. See id.
258. See Baker, supra note 249, at 139.
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for buyers, and so forth.259 In other words, antitrust law as practiced
does not always insist on quantitative evidence—if necessary, anti-
trust agencies search for and offer reliable and appropriate qualita-
tive evidence.
My suggestion here is to lift the skepticism sometimes shown
toward qualitative evidence and to promote greater acceptance of it.
Given the fact that harms to innovation cannot be easily quantified,
treating qualitative evidence dismissively would likely result in
more false negatives, while working to develop reliable qualitative
evidence and to accord it due respect should help reinvigorate
section 2 enforcement.
D. Intent Evidence
Another closely related suggestion involves reclaiming a role for
intent evidence in monopolization analysis. It is true that most
courts and commentators today tend to dismiss intent evidence as
irrelevant and unhelpful to monopolization analysis,260 reasoning
that “the ‘intent’ to create a monopoly anticompetitively cannot be
distinguished from the intent to do so competitively.”261 I disagree
with that view and have written elsewhere that intent evidence is
relevant because it can inform the analysis of effects.262 Intent
evidence can serve as a guide to, and a proxy for, effects when
effects cannot be empirically proven as is often the case,263 because
259. Id. at 139-41 (listing examples of qualitative evidence of buyer substitution that could
be used to define the market in merger analysis).
260. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing most intent
evidence as being of “no value” and referring to analyses of intent as being a “relatively
fruitless inquiry” in antitrust rule of reason cases); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 270
n.14 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejecting opinion and intent evidence); A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose
Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Intent does not help to separate
competition from attempted monopolization.... Traipsing through the warehouses of business
in search of misleading evidence both increases the costs of litigation and reduces the
accuracy of decisions.”); 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 5 (4th
ed. 2013) (“[B]ad intent is easily proven but seldom serves to distinguish situations where the
defendant’s conduct deserves condemnation from those in which it should be left alone.”).
261. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Monopolization Offense, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1035, 1039 (2000).
262. See, e.g., Lao, supra note 230, at 157.
263. See id. at 157, 196-97.
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“no one is likely to know better the probable effects of a practice
than the firm engaging in it.”264
If corporate statements or documents show that a dominant
firm’s actions were intended to eliminate a nascent rival in order to
prevent a possible future threat to its dominance, it would be
reasonable to infer from that intent that the effects of the action
were anticompetitive even if there was no clear showing of competi-
tive harm.265 A careful review of the opinions of both the court of
appeals and the district court in Microsoft, perhaps the most
important monopolization case of the last few decades, suggests
that the courts did precisely that. Though reliance on intent was
never explicitly acknowledged, both opinions were replete with
references to Microsoft’s anticompetitive intent.266 They pointed to
numerous internal corporate documents, senior executive state-
ments, and other evidence of Microsoft’s intentions to destroy
Netscape as a potential competitor and to deceive another potential
competitor, in order to prevent a possible future threat to its
Windows OS monopoly.267
Those opposed to the use of intent evidence have mainly asserted
that procompetitive and anticompetitive intent are difficult to
distinguish,268 that intent evidence is subjective and unreliable,269
and that juries may mistakenly find corporate anticompetitive
intent based on an employee’s use of aggressive war and sports
metaphors to describe their dealings with a competitor.270 In my
264. Id. at 157.
265. Id. at 197 (“[I]ntent evidence can provide helpful clues as to effects, for who would
know better the likely effects of its conduct than the firm responsible for it.”).
266. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (citing
internal Microsoft documents, such as emails, that confirmed that Microsoft intended to
deceive Java developers); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 107-10 (D.D.C.
1999).
267. See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 76-77; Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 107-08; see also Lao,
supra note 230, at 153-54 n.8 (citing other references to Microsoft’s intent in both the D.C.
District Court and D.C. Circuit Court opinions).
268. See, e.g., Joseph F. Brodley & Ching-to Albert Ma, Contract Penalties, Monopolizing
Strategies, and Antitrust Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1993) (“[I]ntent evidence is
generally inferior to objective evidence because competitive and anticompetitive motivations
are often indistinguishable.”); Hovenkamp, supra note 261, at 1039.
269. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 190 (1976)
(“Any doctrine that relies upon proof of intent is going to be applied erratically at best.”).
270. Id. (“Especially misleading here is the inveterate tendency of sales executives to brag
to their superiors about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that are
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view, these problems are overstated.271 Though anticompetitive and
procompetitive intent may sometimes be difficult to distinguish,
factfinders in our judicial system are accustomed to making these
types of determinations.272 Courts are not strangers to the task of
making fine factual distinctions. As for the argument that subjective
intent evidence is suspect because corporate executives’ loose talk
of destroying a competitor, not meant to be taken literally, may be
misconstrued as anticompetitive intent, my response is that this is
precisely the type of assessment that factfinders are competent to
make.273
There is nothing to indicate that juries [or judges] are more
naïve and susceptible to error in discerning intent in antitrust
than in other cases. As long as [steps are taken to ensure that]
the subjective statements carry certain indicia of credibility
[before they are given weight], they can be helpful in interpret-
ing the objective steps taken by a dominant firm, even when the
objective steps themselves are ambiguous.274
In my view, monopolization analysis would be well served by
according more respect to intent evidence, and this is particularly
true in markets where innovation competition is important, such as
those involving the largest digital platforms. Where effects are
difficult to prove, turning to intent evidence as a guide to, or a proxy
for, effect could ease the task of establishing section 2 liability.
CONCLUSION
Antitrust, long used to lying in the legal and technocratic
shadows, has improbably found itself at the center of a public
discourse on concentration, excessive economic and political power,
wealth and income inequality, and problems relating to the
compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naïve.”).
271. See Lao, supra note 230, at 199-205 (summarizing objections to intent evidence and
refuting them).
272. See id. at 200.
273. Id. at 207 (“Assessing whether a particular statement has significance or should be
ignored as ‘a clumsy choice of words to describe innocent behavior’ is precisely the function of
juries in our judicial system.” (internal citation omitted)).
274. Id. at 158.
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seemingly entrenched dominance of the largest digital platforms.275
The new political salience of antitrust has provided us with a much
needed opportunity to rethink contemporary antitrust law and
policy, particularly with respect to monopolization.
Reform efforts in the direction of a no-fault monopolization
approach, however, would be misplaced.276 Economically, it is not at
all clear that no-fault intervention to disperse market power is
likely to be beneficial on balance. If the motivation is noneconomic,
the antitrust laws were not designed to specifically tackle the
serious social and political problems critics have linked to the digital
platforms. Applying and, if necessary, enacting specific laws and
regulations tailored to those problems would be more effective and
constructive. Moreover, if (as it seems) simplicity is what advocates
are after, a no-fault approach is unlikely to deliver since it raises a
number of difficult conceptual and practical questions that are not
easily answerable.
Rather than adopt an approach with uncertain results that would
completely disrupt the current antitrust paradigm, it may be more
productive to seek to reinvigorate section 2 through more modest
changes.277 These changes could include making greater efforts to
identify exclusionary conduct and to work toward extending its
scope, relying on raising rivals’ costs and other more liberal theories
of harm. More flexibility in the analysis of consumer harm would
also be helpful. This could include allowing inference of consumer
harm to be drawn from evidence of harm to the competitive process,
elevating and promoting the theory of long-run innovation harm,
and easing proof of such harm by adopting rebuttable presumptions
of anticompetitive harm in certain situations. Finally, overcoming
some skepticism surrounding the legitimacy and value of qualita-
tive evidence, including intent evidence, would reduce the burden
of proof for establishing liability and, thereby, strengthen section 2
enforcement.
275. See supra Part II.
276. See supra Part III.
277. See supra Part IV.
